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III.

INTRODUCTION

This Reply Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Neil R.
Mitchell ("Mr. Mitchell") responds to issues raised in the brief
of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Lynda Wood ("Ms. Wood").
The facts relevant to this Reply Brief are set forth in Part
VIII of Mr. Mitchell's principal brief and are incorporated
herein by this reference.

For consistency and convenience, the

same abbreviations are used in both briefs.
IV.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

MARGE'S ESTATE IS LIABLE FOR THE RETURN OF THE ESTATE FUNDS
As set forth in Appellant's principal brief, Marge's sole
right and responsibility under the clear, express terms of
Grant's Will was to fund the Trust.
this.

She admittedly failed to do

The Trial Court therefore found that Marge breached her

fiduciary duty as personal representative.

Her only right of

access to those funds was through the Trust.

Because she

converted the Estate Funds in contravention of the express terms
of the Will, this Court need look no further in determining that
Marge's estate is liable for the return of both components of the
Estate Funds—the Estate Cash Deficiency and the Checking Account
Payments.

1

A.

Mr. Mitchell Is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law
on the Estate Cash Deficiency in the Amount of
$52/875.40, as that Amount was Properly Before the
Trial Court.

The Trial Court erred in concluding that Mr. Mitchell did
not dispute Ms. Wood's allegation that the Estate Cash Deficiency
was only $48,100.00, and Ms. Wood's reliance upon that argument
in her brief is similarly misplaced.

As Mr. Mitchell argues in

his principal brief, he clearly disputed Ms. Wood's figure in the
statement of facts supporting his Motion for Summary Judgment.
There, he set forth the amount of $52,875.40 as the undisputed
amount of the Estate Cash Deficiency, based on the Affidavit of
Scott Livingston, an accountant with the firm of Grant Thornton.
He also disputed the basis for Ms. Wood's figure in his
memorandum opposing her motion.

R. 259, 352, 415.

The amount of

$52,875.40 was the only figure properly before the Trial Court
pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P.

The Trial Court should

have adopted that figure as the correct amount of the Estate Cash
Deficiency.
Ms. Wood argues that Marge need only return $48,100.00 of
the Estate Cash Deficiency.

The difference—$4,775.40—is

supposedly comprised of $1,900.00 in personal representative fees
and $2,875.40 in interest on the $50,000.00 Certificate of
Deposit Marge converted.

Marge, however, was not entitled to

either interest or fees.
2

Marge was not entitled to take a fee for her services as
personal representative.
unsupported.

The $1,900.00 figure is arbitrary and

There is no evidence that Marge ever submitted a

petition for compensation or ever received court authorization to
receive compensation, as required by Utah Code Ann., § 75-3-718.
Further, because Marge admittedly breached her fiduciary duty as
personal representative, she would not have been entitled to a
fee for acting as such.
Marge was only entitled to the income from the Trust which
she never formed.
Estate directly.

She was not entitled to anything from the
To the extent she claims any amount as income

in addition to her support, she is making a claim in excess of
even her interpretation of Grant's Will.

Additionally, there is

nothing in the record to support the $2,875.40 claimed by Ms.
Wood as interest on the Certificate of Deposit that Marge
converted.

Her accounting is simply incorrect.

This Court should direct entry of judgment as a matter of
law in the amount of $52,875.40 as the Estate Cash Deficiency.
B.

Marge Was Not Entitled to the Checking Account Payments
in the Amount of $96,642.00, nor any Other funds from
the Estate.

Ms. Wood argues that even though Marge admittedly breached
her fiduciary duty under the Will, her breach was not actionable
because (1) Grant's Estate was not damaged, and (2) Marge would

3

have been entitled to the money anyway had the Trust been funded.
In the event the Court reaches this issue, it cannot adopt
Ms. Wood's position.
breach and conversion.

The Estate has been damaged by Marge's
As set forth more fully in Mr. Mitchell's

principal brief, the express terms and structure of the Will
demonstrate that Marge would not have been entitled to the money
because she had ample resources of her own.

Because Marge was

not entitled to the Checking Account Payments, or any other funds
from the Estate, as the following points illustrate, such funds
would have remained in the Estate.
1.

The "As Is Necessary" Clause in the Will Evidences
Grant's Intent that Marge Not Receive Principal of
the Trust Unless Her Own Resources Were
Insufficient.

The Will instructed Marge to establish the Trust, appointing
Marge and Mr. Mitchell as co-trustees. The co-trustees were only
authorized to distribute "as much of the principal as is necessary for [Marge's] proper health, support, and maintenance and to
maintain her in the standard of living that she enjoyed during
[Grant's] lifetime."

R. 62-63.

Ms. Wood suggests that this

clause created a duty on the part of Mr. Mitchell to disburse
Trust principal to Marge to support her lifestyle.

She argues

that the phrase "as is necessary" referred to how much
Mr. Mitchell should pay her, not whether he should invade the
principal, regardless of Marge's independent resources.
4

The Will, in reality, created the opposite duty for
Mr. Mitchell.

The "as is necessary" clause placed a duty upon

Mr. Mitchell, as co-trustee, to consider Marge's own resources
before invading the principal of the Trust on her behalf.
Because of his fiduciary obligation as a co-trustee, he would not
have been entitled to invade the principal as long as Marge had
sufficient independent resources to pay for her maintenance and
support herself.1
a.

Case Law Supports Mr. Mitchell's Position.

Although this is an issue of first impression before this
Court, several jurisdictions have analyzed similar testamentary
language with similar facts and held that a trustee cannot invade
principal if (1) the gift of principal is "conditioned upon need"
and (2) the life beneficiary has sufficient independent
resources.

On pages 32 and 33 of her brief, Ms. Wood cites her own affidavit
testimony that Marge's expenditures of the Estate Funds were ^reasonable," as
conclusive support for her argument that Marge was entitled to the converted
Estate Funds. Ms. Wood's testimony is not relevant as to whether or not the
expenditures were "reasonable" for purposes of disbursements from the Trust
because she was not one of the co-trustees. Whether a disbursement was
"reasonable" or "necessary" was left to the discretion of the co-trustees.
Ms. Wood f s opinion on this issue, therefore, carries no weight.
The only salient opinion as to whether Marge's expenditures were
reasonable, is that of Mr. Mitchell, the other co-trustee. Ms. Wood argues
that it is speculative for Mr. Mitchell to assert that he would have denied
the disbursements had Marge even sought his approval. The fact that Mr.
Mitchell has pursued this litigation, however, is ample evidence that, had the
Trust been established, he would have opposed disbursements of Trust
principal.

5

Dunklee v. Kettering, 225 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1950) is a wellreasoned and well-supported decision on this issue.

There, the

Colorado Supreme Court analyzed testamentary language and facts
similar to the present case and concluded that the beneficiary
did not have a right to principal of the trust because of his
abundant independent resources.

The will provided:

Upon my death, provided Dr. George K. Dunklee of San
Luis Obispo, California, is then living, that said
trustee pay the entire income of my estate to him
during his lifetime. I further authorize my said
trustee to use as much of the principal of my estate,
in addition to said income, as may be necessary to
provide him with the necessities of life.
Id. at 853.

The remainder beneficiaries argued and offered proof

that Dr. Dunklee enjoyed a large income from his private clinic,
as well as other investment income sources, that his personal
resources were more than sufficient for his support, and that he
could demonstrate no "need" that would warrant an invasion of the
principal of the trust.
The court concluded that "the language used by the testatrix
seems to us to be clear, understandable and unambiguous, and that
she intended that Dr. Dunklee was to receive only the income from
her estate unless it became necessary to use the principal to
provide him with the necessities of life."

Id. at 854-55.

Because Dr. Dunklee's assets were so numerous, the court held

6

that it was inappropriate for the trustee to invade the principal
of the Trust.
The present case is similar.

The testamentary gift of

principal was conditioned upon Marge's "need."

It is undisputed

that Marge was worth over one-half million dollars at the time of
Grant's death and that she did not need Grant's principal to pay
for her support, maintenance, and lifestyle.

In addition to

being entitled to the income from the Trust, her other
independent resources were more than ample.

Because no need

existed, it would have been improper for her to invade the
principal.
The Dunklee court relies upon and carefully analyzes several
similar cases where courts prohibited invasions of principal, or
at least required the trustees to examine the life beneficiaries'
independent resources.2

See In re Martin's Will, 199 N.E. 491, 492 (N.Y. 1936)("the private
income of the beneficiary must be considered in determining whether such need
exists"); In re Seacnst' s Estate, 66 A.2d 836, 838 (Pa. 1949) ("To know the
quality and quantity of [the beneficiary's] private estate becomes very
material in order to determine his good faith and his necessities."); Board of
Visitors v. Safe Deposit and Trust Company, 46 A.2d 280 (Md. Ct. App. 1946)
("circumstances and income of the beneficiary should be taken into
consideration in determining whether to invade the principal of the trust.");
Bridgeport City Trust Company v. Beech, 174 A. 308 (Conn. 1934) (holding under
similar circumstances and testamentary language that, without a showing of
need, principal may not be invaded.); Hull v. Holloway, 20 A. 445, 447 (Conn.
1889)("So long as [the husband] is able to support himself . . ., the trustee
has no right to pay over to him, . . ., any portion of the income or principal
of the trust fund."); Stemple v. Middletown Trust Company, 15 A.2d 305 (Conn.
1940) ("[beneficiary's] personal estate, . . . is to be taken into account by
the trustees in future payments to her."). Copies of these supporting cases
are attached in the Addendum of Mr. Mitchell's principal brief.
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After Dunklee, several jurisdictions have analyzed this
issue and rendered similar decisions.

For example, in Sibson v.

First National Bank & Trust Company, 165 A.2d 800 (N.J. Supp. Ct.
I960), 3 the will provided that the trustee pay to the decedent's
wife "as much of the principal as my trustee in its sole
discretion shall determine necessary for her support, health and
maintenance/'

As in the present case, the decedent had no

children of his own and the remainder beneficiaries under the
trust were his brother and sister and their children.

Based on

the implied intention to benefit the remainder beneficiaries with
some portion of the trust, the court concluded:
"[W]here the life tenant is given the income of the trust,
with a further provision authorizing the trustee to invade
corpus if necessary for the life tenant's support, the
separate income of the life tenant must be considered in
determining whether it is necessary to invade corpus."
Id. at 803.

Because the life beneficiary under the trust had

sufficient assets of her own, distributions of trust principal
"could result in plaintiff's amassing a large estate for her own
testamentary purposes, more or less at the expense of decedent's
estate and the remaindermen named in decedent's will.

Clearly

this is contrary to the testamentary plan expressed by decedent."
Id.

Similarly, Marge's actions in the present case also created

A copy of Sibson, as well as the other cases discussed in this section,
are attached in the Addendum to this Reply Brief.
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a situation that was "clearly contrary" to Grant's testamentary
plan.

See pp. 32-33 of Mr. Mitchell's principal brief.
In Security-People's Trust Company v. United States, 238 F.

Supp. 40 (W.D. Pa. 1965), the testator authorized the trustee "to
advance portions of the principal of the trust estate to or for
use or benefit of the following beneficiaries . . .

at such

times, in such amounts, and for such purposes as my trustee in
its discretion may deem advisable."

The trust then provided for

distribution to remainder beneficiaries upon the death of the
testator's wife, the life beneficiary.

The court found that the

trustee was familiar with the extent of the wife's estate, which
was approximately five times the size of the testamentary estate.
In light of the abundance of the wife's separate assets, the
court concluded:
Since there are a series of further life beneficiaries and
remaindermen, the trustee would be under a strong duty to
protect their interests in the face of any request of the
[wife] for invasion. Under the Pennsylvania decisions, a
court would be bound to look into the assets of her own
estate, which were well known to the trustee, who managed
them.
Id. at 49 (emphasis added).

The court then held that the size of

her estate, alone, would not only "compel the trustee to resist
her request for invasion except for clear necessity, but it would
also guide the court in any attempt to determine the testator's
intent."

The testator was familiar with his wife's assets, and

9

it became clear to the court that the testator's intent was to
benefit the remainder beneficiaries and only provide for his wife
should her personal assets be insufficient.4
Similarly, in the present case, Grant knew of his wife's
resources.

It should likewise be clear to this Court that based

on the size of Marge's own estate, Grant only intended for her to
have access to his money should her independent resources be
insufficient.
In N.C.N.B. National Bank of Florida v. Shanaberger, 616
So.2d 96 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993), the trust in question named Mark
Shanaberger as the income beneficiary.

Upon his death, two

remainder trusts were to be created for the benefit of the
trustor's nieces.

The Will instructed the trustee to "invade the

principal of the trust estate and pay from the said principal so
much of it as in the sole discretion of the trustee is necessary
for the care and maintenance, support and medical attention of
Mark Shanaberger."

Id. at 97.

The parties stipulated that the

settlor and Mr. Shanaberger had full knowledge of each other's
respective financial situation and that the settlor knew that
Shanaberger's assets and "income exceeded her own and were
sufficient to meet his anticipated medical costs and expenses

The Security-People's Trust case cites several Pennsylvania cases for
the same proposition.
10

without contribution from her trust funds."

Id.

The court

determined that the trustee was accountable to the remaindermen.
In order to fulfill that fiduciary obligation, the trustee was
required to look at the life beneficiary's own assets to
determine whether there was a need to invade the principal.
Likewise, in the present case, Mr. Mitchell would have been under
a similar duty to the Trust, and any invasion of principal would
have been a breach of that duty.
In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 1969) is a seminal
case.

There, the will established a trust for the benefit of the

decedent's widow for life, and for the benefit of the couple's
children, as remainder beneficiaries.

The trust provided that

the income be used directly for the widow's benefit and that, "if
such income be insufficient for the support and maintenance of
Elsie, my trustee shall so pay or use from principal sufficient
monies to provide for Elsie's support and maintenance, in the
sole, absolute and uncontrolled discretion of the trustee."
at 719 (emphasis added).

Id.

In construing this provision, Chief

Judge Fuld determined that even though the trustee had absolute
and sole discretion, the testamentary gift of principal was
conditioned upon the widow's need.

Accordingly, the trustee was

entitled to take into account the widow's private resources

11

before making an invasion of principal.

Specifically, the court

stated:
The principle which emerges from the case may be
briefly stated. A trustee, particularly when given
uncontrolled discretion to invade principal . . ., may,
before deciding to effect an invasion, take into
account the beneficiary's independent resources where
there is no "absolute" gift of principal, the prime
gift being that of income, and the testator intended
that the invasion of the principal be dependent upon
the needs or requirements of the beneficiary.
Id. at 720.
In the present case, had Mr. Mitchell been informed of
Marge's desire to invade the principal, he would have been
required to look at Marge's independent resources in order to
fulfill his fiduciary obligation to the Trust.

He would have

found ample liquid assets and, as such, would have been
constrained to avoid depletion of the principal.
b.

Case Law Refutes Ms. Wood's Argument.

In addition to showing that Marge was not entitled to the
Estate Funds, these cases bring to light two additional points
that counter Ms. Wood's arguments.

First, several of the wills

analyzed in the above-cited cases state that the trustee "shall"
distribute principal to the beneficiary as is necessary.

See

e.g., In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d at 720; Hull v. Holloway,
20 A. at 447; Stemple v. Middletown Trust Co., 15 A.2d at 307.
In spite of Ms. Wood's argument to the contrary, whether the will
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says the trustee "shall" or "may" distribute principal appears to
be an insignificant point in those cases.

If a will says "shall

distribute", but that directive is then qualified by the phrase
"as is necessary," the beneficiary is not entitled to principal
disbursements unless a "need" truly exists because the beneficiary's own resources are insufficient.
Second, Ms. Wood argues that the "as is necessary" language
only places a qualification on the amount of the distribution,
not whether such distribution is appropriate.

The wills in

Stemple, Sibson v. First National Bank & Trust Co., and N.C.N.B.
Bank v. Shanaberger instructed their trustees to "pay so much of
the principal as is necessary . . . "
instructions in Grant's Will.

—similar to the

Contrary to Ms. Wood's contention,

however, the courts in those cases indicated that the testamentary language placed a condition on whether the trustee should
make a distribution, not how much the distribution should be.
Finally, the cases cited by Ms. Wood in support of her
position are factually distinguishable from the present case.

In

First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224 (Wyo.
1966), for example, the life beneficiary of the trust had limited
assets.
1960.

Her husband died in 1936, and the case was brought in
If her own assets were not depleted by then, they were

likely nearly gone, in spite of her remarriage.

13

In In re

Lindgren, 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1994) and Godfrey v. Chandley, 811
P.2d 1248 (Kan. 1991), both life beneficiaries were alive, living
in nursing homes, and legally incompetent or suffering from
Alzheimer's.

In Lindgren, the Will expressly stated that the

purpose of the testamentary trust was to "provide for and assure
so far as possible, the generous care and support of the
beneficiary during her lifetime."

Because of Mrs. Lindgren's

financial condition, her conservator was required to pay for her
nursing home care out of the conservator's own pocket, and the
action was brought mainly to recover the conservator's losses.
885 P.2d at 1281.

In Godfrey, the grantor devised substantially

all of his property to the life beneficiary.

811 P.2d at 1250.

These are very different factual settings than those of the
present case.

Marge was neither destitute nor in a nursing home

at the time of Grant's death.

Nothing in the express terms of

the Will evidence an intent that Marge have unrestricted use of
the principal.

She enjoyed her own estate of over one-half

million dollars which continued to grow as she helped herself to
the resources of Grant's Estate.

The life beneficiaries in

Finkbiner, Lindgren, and Godfrey were all destitute, or nearly
destitute, widows who had little or no means to support
themselves, other than with their late husbands' money.

Here,

even though Marge was advanced in years, her own personal wealth

14

would have precluded her inappropriate invasions of the Estate
Funds.
2.

The Will, as Supplemented by Surrounding
Circumstances, is Sufficient to Ascertain Grant's
Intent,

Based on the foregoing arguments and cases, it is
Mr. Mitchell's position that the Will clearly expresses Grant's
intent that Marge only receive Trust principal if her ample
independent resources were insufficient for her support.

If,

however, the Court finds an ambiguity as to the interpretation of
this clause, it is entitled #to look beyond the "four corners" of
the Will for guidance.

In fact, Finkbiner, cited by Ms. Wood, as

well as other cases, instructs courts in such situations to look
to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will in
order to ascertain testamentary intent.

416 P.2d at 228/ See

also. In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d at 720.
The record of "surrounding circumstances" in this case is
relatively sparse, as the matter was summarily decided below.
the extent surrounding circumstances are in the record, they
support Mr. Mitchell's position.

For example, Marge had ample

assets of her own, and the couple was advanced in years at the
time of the execution of the Will.
Grant's money.

Marge clearly did not need

She could easily pay her own expenses with her

own money.

15

To

The record of surrounding circumstances, on the other hand,
does not support Ms. Wood's contentions.

The "facts" in

Ms. Wood's brief are either not in the record or are misrepresented.

For example, Ms. Wood repeatedly asserts that Marge was

bedridden and therefore Grant intended her to have free reign of
the Estate Funds.

This however, is a mischaracterization of

Ms. Wood's own affidavit testimony.

Ms. Wood's Affidavit does

not indicate that Marge was bedridden at the time Grant executed
his Will, which is the critical time for determining his testamentary intent.

Further, Ms. Wood testifies that "[a] few months

after Grant's death, [Marge] discontinued the night nursing
care," which implies that Marge was not confined to her bed or in
need of such assistance.

R. 406-408.

Marge's subsequent

physical condition has not been accurately defined by Ms. Wood's
Affidavit, cannot be considered in ascertaining testamentary
intent, and should not be used to play on the sympathies of the
Court.

Marge was represented by counsel at the time, and there

is no evidence that she was not in full control of her faculties.
Ms. Wood also incorrectly asserts on pages 20 and 21 of her
brief that if Marge had to use her own resources instead of
converting the Estate Funds, she would have been required to sell
her home in order to do so.

This is patently untrue. The record

reflects that at the time of Grant's death, Marge had over
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$150,000.00 in cash and $286,500.00 held in certificates of
deposit.

See Ms. Wood's Answers to Interrogatories, R.281-83.

Marge would have been required to spend over $400,000.00 of her
net worth of $515,455.21 before depleting her liquid assets.
Ms. Wood's affidavit does not address many relevant
surrounding circumstances and distorts some facts that are
addressed, such as gifts made by Marge.

Even considering Ms.

Wood's Affidavit, the present record does not support her
position.5

While Mr. Mitchell believes Grant's intent is clearly

expressed in the Will, if this Court determines that the record
should be augmented to more fully elucidate Grant's intent, the
matter should be remanded to the Trial Court for further factual
determination.
3.

Grant's Estate Planning Strategies Were Intended
to Benefit the Remainder Beneficiaries/ Not Marge.

As Ms. Wood concedes in her brief, Grant's design in creating the Trust was to reduce exposure to estate tax liability.
However, Ms. Wood attempts to argue that Grant's tax planning was
designed to benefit Marge, not the remainder beneficiaries, and
The affidavit of John McCoy, upon which Ms. Wood relied below and now
relies in her brief, should also be disregarded or given little weight.
Mr. McCoy attempts to establish Grant's testamentary intent through inadmissible hearsay as to statements Grant made at or near the time he executed his
Will. See Rules 801, 802, Utah R. Evid. Additionally, Mr. McCoy, as counsel
for Ms. Wood, is not permitted to testify in this proceeding. See Rule 3.7,
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
This issue was raised below in Mr. Mitchell's Memorandum in opposition
to Ms. Wood's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 412-17.
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that Grant intended her to have unrestricted access to the Estate
Funds,
that

In fact on pages 28 and 29 of her brief, Ms. Wood argues

XN

Grant's Will makes perfectly clear that these intentions

[to avoid excessive estate taxation] superseded any desire to
preserve the Estate for residuary beneficiaries."
Ms. Wood's arguments, however, do not make sense for two
reasons.

First, there is absolutely no tax benefit that could

have been conferred on Marge by virtue of the Trust.

Had Grant

intended for her to have unlimited access to his assets, he could
have left his entire Estate to her, tax free.
2650.

See 26 U.S.C. §

The tax benefits intended, therefore, could only have been

intended for the remainder beneficiaries.
Second, in order to realize such a tax benefit to the
remainder beneficiaries of the surviving spouse, Marge needed to
fund the Trust so that her access to the principal of the Trust
was restricted.

An individual may create a trust whereby his

estate will be placed in trust for the benefit of his surviving
spouse for life, to then be distributed to remainder beneficiaries upon the death of the survivor.

As long as the principal

is only distributed to the life beneficiary pursuant to the
restrictions in the trust, the trust will not be taxed in the
survivor's estate.

See 26 U.S.C. § 2041 (b) (1) (A) .
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By failing to fund the Trust, Marge risked destroying
Grant's tax planning.

In light of this risk, the Trial Court's

ruling is contrary to public policy.

If this Court were to

affirm that ruling, it would establish precedent in this state,
allowing personal representatives to ignore testators' intent
regardless of the potential tax consequences to others.
C.

Mr. Mitchell's Estoppel Argument Is Appropriately
Before this Court.

In his principal memorandum, Mr. Mitchell argues that
Ms. Wood and Marge's estate should be equitably estopped from
denying liability for the missing Estate Funds, particularly in
light of Marge's shortcomings as personal representative.
Ms. Wood, however, claims that this argument is inappropriate
because it was not raised below.

Mr. Mitchell acknowledges the

rule that an appellant cannot raise new issues on appeal.
however, is not a new issue.

It is simply a new argument.

issue remains the same as in the Trial Court:

This,
The

Did Marge breach

her fiduciary duty and is her estate now liable for the return of
the Estate Funds because of that breach?

This new estoppel

argument simply proposes another reason why Marge's estate cannot
escape liability.

Marge's disregard for her duty and the fact

that her revision of her own will thwarted Grant's estate planning, are examples of inequitable conduct that should preclude
Ms. Wood's attempt to avoid liability.
19

POINT II
MS. WOOD IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN HER
CROSS APPEAL
A,

The Personal Injury Settlement Proceeds Are Property of
Grant's Estate.

Marge was not entitled to the proceeds of the settlement of
Grant's personal injury action, as Ms. Wood argues in her crossappeal.

According to Utah's Survival Statute, Utah Code Ann., §

78-11-12 (b), the settlement proceeds belong to Grant's Estate.
That statute reads:
If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies
as a result of a cause other than the injury received as a
result of the wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer,
the personal representative or heirs of that person are
entitled to receive no more than the out-of-pocket expenses
incurred by or on behalf of that injured person as the
result of his injury.
(Emphasis added.)

Thus, the proceeds of such a settlement would

go to the personal representative of the estate, if the plaintiff
died with a valid will, or to the intestate heirs if the
plaintiff died without a will.
Grant died before resolution of the lawsuit.

After his

death, his Estate settled the claim for $12,445.86.
his Will and did not die intestate.

Grant had

Therefore, according to the

statute, the proceeds of the settlement were to go to Marge in
her capacity as personal representative of the Estate, and not in

20

her individual capacity.

Her duty, which she failed to execute,

was to place the proceeds of the settlement into the Estate where
they could be applied to the purposes and in the manner
prescribed by the Will.

Because she converted those proceeds in

contravention of that duty, her estate is liable for the return
of $12,445.86.6
Ms. Wood's reliance on In re Behm's Estate/ 213 P.2d 657
(Utah 1950) is misplaced because Behm/ as well as the other cases
she cites, dealt with a cause of action for wrongful death, not a
personal injury settlement.

The policy considerations as to who

owns a cause of action are very different between wrongful death
and personal injury claims.

As Judge Hanson clearly and

correctly articulated at the hearing on the Motions for Summary
Judgment below, in a wrongful death action, the heirs of the
decedent personally hold claims for loss of consortium, lost
support, and other personal losses.
887 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

See In re Estate of Haro,
In a personal injury case, on

the other hand, the only party that has a claim for damages is
the injured person-- "not their spouse or their children or
anybody else."

Transcript of Oral Argument, R. 563-64.

g

Marge was not entitled to the settlement proceeds as Grant's "only
surviving intestate heir," as Ms. Wood argues, because Grant did not die
"intestate." He died with his Will in place. The Will did not name Marge as
a devisee of anything except personal property. It only named her as the
personal representative responsible for including the settlement proceeds in
the Estate.
21

If the injured party dies from causes other than the
original injury, the heirs do not inherit the cause of action.
Pursuant to the Survival Statute, the decedent's estate is
entitled only to the out-of-pocket expenses paid by the decedent
prior to his death, and any settlement proceeds should therefore
go directly into the decedent's estate.

The following exchange

at the hearing in the Trial Court emphasizes the intent of that
statute:
MR. MCCOY:
Well, I think that the [survival]
statute intended to benefit those heirs that were directly
affected by the tort case ...
THE COURT:
Well, and that's exactly what it would
do if it went into the estate of [Grant], not directly but
indirectly it would benefit the heirs that he said should
benefit....
R. 564.

Thus, in order to properly carry out the letter and

intent of the survival statute, to properly benefit Grant's
Estate, and to properly reimburse the Estate for expenses
incurred prior to Grant's death, the settlement proceeds from the
personal injury action should be returned to Grant's Estate.
B.

The Trial Court Was Correct in Awarding Interest to Mr.
Mitchell on the Estate Cash Deficiency.

An award of interest by a trial court is within the court's
equitable discretion.

Such a decision, therefore, will only be

disturbed if there has been an abuse of discretion.

Ms. Wood

claims her alleged settlement offer is tantamount to a "tender."
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On her denial of Mr. Mitchell's claim, however, she denied
liability on the entire amount and refused the claim.
161.

R. 17, 47,

Further, the Affidavit of John McCoy states that the

$48,100.00 was offered in settlement of the entire matter,
including the issue of the personal injury settlement, which was
decided below in favor of Mr. Mitchell.

In light of this, the

Trial Court's award of interest is appropriate, authorized, and
should therefore stand.
V.

CONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED

Mr. Mitchell respectfully requests that this Court find in
his favor and reverse that part of the Trial Court's Order
denying part of Mr. Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment on his
claim and granting Ms. Wood's Motion for Summary Judgment in
part.

Accordingly, Mr. Mitchell requests that this Court reverse

the Trial Court's Order as to the Checking Account Payments and
Estate Cash Deficiency by granting Mr. Mitchell judgment as a
matter of law on the full amount of $96,642.58 and $52,875.40,
respectively.
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Mr, Mitchell also hereby requests oral argument on this
appeal.

DATED this 21st day of December, 1995,
SNOW, CHRISTEN^N/& (MkgTTINEAU

Kim R. Wilson
David L. Pinkston
Attorneys for Appellant, Neil R,
Mitchell
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of December, 1995, I
mailed two true and correct copies of the Reply Brief of
Appellant first class, postage prepaid, to the following:
John L. McCoy, Esq.
310 South Main, #1305
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Attorneys for Neil R.
Mitchell, Appellant
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165A.2d800
(Cite as: 64 N. J.Super. 225, 165 A.2d 800)
Grace M. SIBSON, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY OF PAULSBORO, Trustee
under the Will of
William A. Sibson, Deceased, DefendantRespondent,
and
Walter W. SIBSON et al., DefendantsAppellants.
No. A-782.
Superior Court of New Jersey
Appellate Division.
Argued Nov. 7, 1960.
Decided Dec. 6, 1960.
Action by widow for construction of trust
provision of her husband's will. From adverse
judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery
Division, Gloucester County, 61 N. J.Super. 88,
160 A.2d 76, the remaindermen appealed.
The Superior Court, Appellate Division,
Sullivan,
J.A.D.,
held
that
under
testamentary trust directing payment of
income therefrom to testator's wife for life and
authorizing trustee to pay such portion of
corpus to wife as should be necessary for her
support, health and maintenance, it was not
intention of testator, who had received
substantial legacies from his family and who
had no children of his own and who was
friendly with his brother and sister and their
children and who left remainder to his brother
and sister, that wife was to be supported
wholly out of trust income and corpus without
regard to her own separate income, and
separate income of wife had to be considered
in determining whether it was necessary to
invade the corpus, but it was not necessary
that wife exhaust her separate estate before
recourse could be had to corpus of trust.
Judgment modified.
[11 WILLS <3~ 440
409k440
In construing a will, function of court is to
ascertain and give effect to purpose of testator

1

as set forth in his will, and court is not limited
by form or terminology in its quest of what
testator meant by his testamentary language,
and entire will must be considered rather than
an isolated portion thereof, and where there is
an ambiguity, surrounding facts and
circumstances
are
proper
objects
of
consideration.
[1] WILLS <®=> 441
409k441
In construing a will, function of court is to
ascertain and give effect to purpose of testator
as set forth in his will, and court is not limited
by form or terminology in its quest of what
testator meant by his testamentary language,
and entire will must be considered rather than
an isolated portion thereof, and where there is
an ambiguity, surrounding facts and
circumstances
are
proper
objects
of
consideration.
[1] WILLS <&* 470(1)
409k470(l)
In construing a will, function of court is to
ascertain and give effect to purpose of testator
as set forth in his will, and court is not limited
by form or terminology in its quest of what
testator meant by his testamentary language,
and entire will must be considered rather than
an isolated portion thereof, and where there is
an ambiguity, surrounding facts and
circumstances
are
proper
objects
of
consideration.
[2] WILLS < ^ 684.10(5)
409k684.10(5)
Under testamentary trust directing payment
of income therefrom to testator's wife for life
and authorizing trustee to pay such portion of
corpus of trust to wife as should be necessary
for her support, health and maintenance, it
was not intention of testator, who had received
substantial legacies from his family and who
had no children of his own and who was
friendly with his brother and sister and their
children, who left remainder to brother and
sister, that wife was to be supported wholly
out of trust income and corpus without regard
to her own separate income, and separate
income of wife had to be considered in
determining whether it was necessary to
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165A.2d800
(Cite as: 64 N. J.Super. 225, 165 A.2d 800)
invade the corpus, but it was not necessary
that wife exhaust her separate estate before
recourse could be had to corpus of trust.
[3] WILLS <3=* 441
409k441
In determining intent of testator, only those
circumstances which were known to testator
when he made his will will be considered in
determining his intent.
**801 *226 Martin F. Caulfield, Woodbury,
for plaintiff-Respondent (Hannold & Hannold,
Woodbury, attorneys).
Robert E. Gladden, Camden, for defendantrespondent (Ross & Gladden, Camden,
attorneys).
John P. Hauch, Jr., Camden, for defendantsappellants (Archer, Greiner, Hunter & Read,
Camden, attorneys).
Before Judges
SULLIVAN.

PRICE,

GAULKIN

and

*227 The opinion of the court was delivered
by
SULLIVAN, J.A.D.
This appeal is from the judgment of the trial
court construing certain provisions of the will
of William A. Sibson (hereinafter referred to
as decedent) who died on August 17, 1955, a
resident of Gloucester County. Plaintiff is his
widow.
Defendants-appellants are the
remaindermen under the will.
Plaintiff married the decedent on February
3, 1931. No children were born of this
marriage, which was decedent's first and
plaintiffs second. Plaintiff had no children by
her previous marriage. During her marriage
to decedent, plaintiff appears to have had not
separate estate or income of her own and was
entirely dependent on her husband for her
support.
The will of decedent had been executed on
May 14, 1951.
Briefly, it provided in
paragraph Fifth that if plaintiff survived
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decedent for 30 days, a trust was to be
established of the residue of the estate, and
'(A) To pay in quarter-annual installments
the net income arising from the said
residuary estate, hereinafter designated
'principal', to my said wife for as long as she
shall live, such payments to commence as
soon after may deceased as may be
reasonably convenient for my Trustee, and
further to pay to my said wife, freed and
discharged from all trusts and uses, as much
of the principal as my Trustee in its sole
discretion shall determine necessary for her
support, health and maintenance.'
Upon the death of plaintiff, 'the remaining
principal, if any,' was to be distributed to
decedent's brother and sister or their issue.
Pursuant to the will the trust was set up by
defendant-respondent trustee, and the income
thereof, approximating $3,750 annually, has
been paid to plaintiff. In addition, the trustee
has advanced to plaintiff, out of trust
principal, the sum of $1,075 for painting and
repairs to the house in which plaintiff lives.
In April 1959 plaintiff filed this suit seeking
construction of decedent's will and directing
the trustee to make payments *228 to her out
of the Corpus of the trust. The case was
submitted to the trial court on the pleadings,
pretrial order and the depositions of plaintiff
and her brother-in-law, who handled all of
plaintiff's business affairs.
The record indicates the following. At the
present time plaintiff is the sole owner of the
home in which she lives in Woodbury, New
Jersey. The property, which is unencumbered,
originally belonged to plaintiff and decedent
as tenants by the entirety. Plaintiff also has a
life estate in a summer home in Canada.
Shortly before decedent's death he gave
plaintiff $2,000, and on his death she collected
$2,500 on **802 a life insurance policy and
also received $21,600 over a period of three
years from a group life insurance policy which
covered decedent. Plaintiff is the beneficiary
of a non-taxable annuity of $1,200 paid by
decedent's former employer, and since 1957
has been receiving Social Security payments
at a current rate of $83.30 per month. Since
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165 A.2d 800
(Cite as: 64 N.J.Super. 225, "228, 165 A.2d 800, **802)
decedent's death she has invested $34,242.19
in securities which produce an annual income
of $1,200. She also has bank accounts totaling
$4,000 and a 1959 automobile purchased for
$2,750.
It thus appears that plaintiff is in receipt of
independent income of her own approximating
$3,400 annually which, together with her
income from the trust, gives her a total
income of approximately $7,150. Her federal
income tax is about $600. Plaintiffs average
expenses for the past four years were shown to
be $3,300 per year and, while plaintiff
asserted that they represented a thriftier
manner of living than that to which she was
accustomed while her husband was living, the
trial court found that her total income from all
sources was quite adequate to maintain her
according to her former standard of living.
At the trial plaintiff took the position that
paragraph Fifth (A) of the will meant that (1)
plaintiff was to receive all of the income from
the trust, and (2) all of the expenses necessary
for plaintiffs support, health and maintenance
were to be paid out of the principal of the
trust. The *229 trial court rejected the latter
contention and held that the provision
'necessary for her support, health and
maintenance' referred to the possible
inadequacy of trust income for these purposes.
The court, in effect, construed paragraph
Fifth (A) to mean that to the extent that the
income of the trust was inadequate to provide
for
plaintiffs
support,
health
and
maintenance, recourse was to be had to trust
Corpus. The court therefore directed the
trustee not to take plaintiffs separate income
into consideration in determining what
payments should be made out of Corpus.
The trial court attached particular
significance to the gift over of 'the remaining
principal, if any,' after plaintiffs death. This
indicated to the trial court that decedent
contemplated the very real possibility that
there might be no Corpus left over for the
remaindermen. The court held that such
provision indicated that plaintiff was to be the
primary object of decedent's bounty in the use
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of the Corpus, which was 'to be liberal and not
just a stopgap against the vicissitudes of life.'
The trial court's opinion is reported in 61
N. J.Super. 88, 160 A.2d 76 (Ch.Div.1960)
[1] In construing a will the function of the
court is to ascertain and give effect to the
purpose of the testator as set forth in his will.
Busch v. Plews, 12 N.J. 352, 96 A.2d 761
(1953). The court is not limited by form or
terminology in its quest of what the testator
meant by his testamentary language. The
entire will must be considered rather than an
isolated portion thereof, and where there is an
ambiguity,
surrounding
facts
and
circumstances
are
proper
objects
of
consideration.
Morristown Trust Co. v.
McCann, 19 N.J. 568,118 A.2d 16 (1955).
[2] The provisions of the will at hand
indicate that decedent wanted his wife amply
provided for during her lifetime but, save for a
bequest of his 'strictly personal effects' to
plaintiff, he did not want her to receive any
part of the principal of his estate unless
necessary for her support. To that end his
estate is preserved during plaintiffs *230
lifetime, but upon her death it goes to
decedent's blood relatives.
The record shows that decedent had received
substantial legacies from his family. He had
no children of his own and was friendly with
his brother and sister and their children. It
was therefore perfectly natural for decedent to
provide that his entire estate should go to his
blood relatives **803 after his wife had been
amply taken care of during her lifetime.
We do not agree with the trial court's ruling
that decedent intended that plaintiff was to be
supported wholly out of trust income and
Corpus without regard to plaintiffs separate
income. We do not interpret paragraph Fifth
to have that meaning. Normal understanding
of the language used by decedent would
indicate that plaintiffs separate income was
to be considered. How else would the trustee
determine what was necessary for her
support?
In addition, the greater part of
plaintiffs separate income comes from sources
provided or arranged for by decedent during
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165 A.2d 800
(Cite as: 64 N. J.Super. 225, *230, 165 A.2d 800,
his lifetime. The provisions in the will are all
part of the same pattern and must be
interpreted in the light of these surrounding
facts and circumstances.
[3] Plaintiff argues that there is nothing in
the record to show that in April 1951, the date
decedent's will was executed, any of these
circumstances were in existence or had been
arranged for by decedent, and cites Zwoyer v.
Hackensack Trust Co., 61 N.J.Super. 9, 160
A.2d 156 (App.Div.1960), for the proposition
that only those circumstances which were
known to decedent when he made his will may
be considered in determining his intent.
The rule cited is correct but its application
to the facts of this case is invalid. Decedent's
will speaks as of the date of his death, and it is
only reasonable to assume that decedent, in
expressing his testamentary plan for his wife,
intended that such plan would fit in with
whatever other arrangements he either had
made or would make in the future for her. So,
too, with plaintiffs Social Security *231
payments which commenced about 1957.
Certainly decedent, in planning for his wife's
security, would have been aware that plaintiff
would eventually come into these benefits.
There are cases where a testator establishes
a trust 'for support,' and specifies that if the
income from such trust is insufficient for that
purpose, then so much of Corpus as may be
necessary for that purpose shall be used. In
such instance the courts have held that the
testator has clearly indicated that the trust is
to provide the entire support without
considering the beneficiary's separate income.
Pearce v. Marcellus, 137 N. J.Eq. 599, 45 A.2d
889 (E. & A. 1945); Hicks v. Jones, 138
N.J.Eq. 280, 47 A.2d 894 (Ch.1946); Orange
First National Bank v. Preiss, 2 N.J.Super.
486, 64 A.2d 475 (Ch.Div.1949).
However, where the life tenant is given the
income of the trust, with a further provision
authorizing the trustee to invade Corpus if
necessary for the life tenant's support, the
separate income of the life tenant must be
considered in determining whether it is
necessary to invade Corpus.
Stetson v.
Copr. ® West 1995 No claim
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803)
Community Chest, 24 N.J.Super. 243, 93 A.2d
796 (Ch.Div.1952); In re WiUey's Estate, 139
N.J.Eq. 118, 48 A.2d 789 (Prerog.1946). Cf.
Renner v. Castellano, 21 N.J.Super. 331, 91
A.2dl76(Ch.Div.l952).
In 2 A.L.R.2d, at p. 1431, in discussing this
question, it is stated that no general rule is
available other than that the intention of the
testator must govern in each particular case.
The Annotation adds, at p. 1432, that:
'By the weight of authority, unless the
language
of the
trust
instrument
affirmatively reveals an intention to make a
gift of the stated benefaction regardless of
the beneficiary's other means, the trustee
should consider such other means in
exercising his discretion to disburse the
principal for the purpose.'
The construction given the will by the trial
court could result in plaintiffs amassing a
large estate for her own testamentary
purposes, more or less at the expense of
decedent's estate and the remaindermen
named in decedent's will. *232 Clearly, this is
contrary to the testamentary plan expressed
by decedent.
We hold that under a proper construction of
decedent's will the separate income **804 of
plaintiff is to be considered by the trustee. It
has been suggested by appellants that not only
plaintiffs separate income but also her
separate estate would have to be exhausted
before recourse could be had to trust Corpus.
We do not read the will to mean that the use
of trust Corpus is so limited. If the trust
income, together with plaintiffs separate
income, is insufficient to provide for plaintiffs
support, health and maintenance, trust Corpus
is to be used, and the trustee is to administer
the trust accordingly.
The judgment of the trial court is modified
to the extent indicated herein.
END OF DOCUMENT
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238T\Supp. 40
65-1 USTC P 12,294
(Cite as: 238 F.Supp. 40)
SECURITY-PEOPLES TRUST
COMPANY, Executor of the Estate of
Edna Buhl Putts,
Deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 1101- Erie.
United States District Court W.D.
Pennsylvania.
Feb. 2,1965.
Action to recover estate takes paid. The
District Court, Weber, J., held that decedent
did not possess, for estate tax purposes,
general power of appointment over assets in
trust estate established under will of her
husband where (1) title and possession of trust
assets was in hands of independent corporate
trustee legally accountable under state law,
for its administration, not only to decedent but
to successive life income beneficiaries and
remaindermen and (2) trustee alone was
vested with discretion to make invasion of
principal.

1

obligation to exercise in good faith power to
use, occupy, consume, sell or dispose of
property.
[4] TRUSTS < ^ 135
390kl35
An "active trust", in Pennsylvania, is one in
which active duties are imposed on trustee
with respect to control and management of
subject matter, and trust remains active so
long as it is necessary that legal title to assets
remain in trustee to enable him to perform his
duties.
See publication Words and Phrases for other
judicial constructions and definitions.
[5] TRUSTS &=> 131
390kl31
When there is no longer any duty in trustee
except to transfer over to beneficiaries income
and corpus of trust estate, trust becomes a
"dry trust," and statute of uses, as part of
common law of Pennsylvania, terminates
trust.
See publication Words and Phrases for other
judicial constructions and definitions.

Order accordingly.
[1] INTERNAL REVENUE <S^ 4157.10(1)
220k4157.10(l)
Formerly 220k994
It was congressional intent to tax as part of
estate of decedent any property over which
decedent had such power of control as to be
able to (1) apply it to his own benefit or benefit
of his creditors, (2) dispose of it by will, (3)
appoint it to his estate or creditors of his
estate, or (4) consume it without restriction.
26 U.S.C.A. (LR.C.1954) § 2041.
[2] WILLS < ^ 470(3)
409k470(3)
Under Pennsylvania law, true intention of
testator, as found within four corners of will,
must govern.
[3] POWERS <3^ 32
307k32
Life tenant has, under Pennsylvania law,

[5] TRUSTS <&= 136
390kl36
When there is no longer any duty in trustee
except to transfer over to beneficiaries income
and corpus of trust estate, trust becomes a
"dry trust," and statute of uses, as part of
common law of Pennsylvania, terminates
trust.
See publication Words and Phrases for other
judicial constructions and definitions.
[61 TRUSTS <®^ 276
390k276
Pennsylvania courts compel exercise of
trustee's discretion to pay principal only when
there has been showing of necessity and clear
direction in trust instrument.
[7] TRUSTS <S^ 276
390k276
Where there was series of further

life
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(Cite as: 238 F.Supp. 40)
beneficiaries and remaindermen, trustee
would be under strong duty to protect their
interests in face of any request of life
beneficiary for invasion of corpus and, under
Pennsylvania law, would be bound to look into
assets of life beneficiary's own estate to
determine necessity.
[8] WILLS < ^ 441
409k441
Court
may
look
to
extrinsic
and
contemporaneous circumstances to ascertain
testator's intent.
[9] INTERNAL REVENUE <3=> 4157.10(3)
220k4157.10(3)
Formerly 220k994
Not every case must meet the "ascertainable
standards" test but only those in which there
is first shown a power in decedent to transfer
or appropriate to himself; and even where
such power is held by decedent, exception .to
taxation may still result if power of decedent
was limited by "ascertainable standards." 26
U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 2041.
[10] INTERNAL REVENUE <&=> 4157.10(3)
220k4157.10(3)
Formerly 220kl004
If power of decedent was not of standard
defined by Code as "general power", as
measured by state law, "ascertainable
standards" test need not be applied to
determine
taxability.
26
U.S.C.A.
(I.R.C.1954) § 2041.
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exercisable in all events" by surviving spouse
which qualifies assets for marital deduction.
26 U.S.C.A. (LR.C.1954) §§ 2041, 2055, 2056
and subd. (b) (5).
[131 INTERNAL REVENUE O^ 4157.10(1)
220k4157.10(l)
Formerly 220kl004
If decedent had no power to appoint to herself
exercisable in all events she had no "general
power of appointment", for estate tax
purposes. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 2041.
[141 INTERNAL REVENUE G=> 4157.10(1)
220k4157.10(l)
Formerly 220kl004
Decedent did not possess, for estate tax
purposes, general power of appointment over
assets in trust estate established under will of
her husband, where (1) title and possession of
trust assets was in hands of independent
corporate trustee legally accountable under
state law, for its administration, not only to
decedent but to successive life income
beneficiaries and remaindermen and (2)
trustee alone was vested with discretion to
make invasion of principal. 26 U.S.C.A.
(I.R.C.1954) § 2041.
•41 Daniel L. R. Miller, McClure & Miller,
Erie, Pa., for plaintiff.
Gustave Diamond, U.S. Atty., Pittsburgh,
Pa., for defendant.
WEBER, District Judge.

[11] INTERNAL REVENUE «=> 4169(4)
220k4169(4)
Formerly 220kl008.3
Statute requires, as test of eligibility for
marital deduction, that surviving spouse who
has life estate must also have power to
appoint which is exercisable in all events. 26
U.S.C.A. (LR.C.1954) § 2056.
[12] INTERNAL REVENUE < ^ 4157.10(1)
220k4157.10(l)
Formerly 220kl004
The "general power of appointment" which is
standard for determining inclusion of assets in
gross estate of decedent is power of same kind
and quality as "power of appointment

This case involves an action in the United
States District Court to recover estate taxes
paid by decedent's estate on the corpus of a
testamentary trust established under the willl
of decedent's husband.
The government
claims that the tax is due under the provisions
of § 2041(aX2) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 26 U.S.C.1958 Ed. § 2041; 26 U.S.C.A. §
2041.
Decedent, Edna Buhl Putts, died testate
June 7,1960, a resident of Erie, Pennsylvania.
A deficiency in estate taxes was assessed
against her estate by the Internal Revenue
Service by reason of its inclusion in her estate

Copr. ® West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works

WESTLAW

Page 3

238 F.Supp. 40
(Cite as: 238 F.Supp. 40, *41)
of the corpus of the trust in question. This was
paid, a timely claim for refund was made and
disallowed, and this action followed.
A trial was held before this Court without
jury. Most of the matters in evidence were
stipulated between the parties. Taxpayer
produced two witnesses, trust officers of
plaintiff bank, to testify as to the computation
of the refund claimed by plaintiff, and to
testify, under objection by the government,
that there had been no invasion of the
principal of the trust fund during decedent's
life, and no request from decedent for such
invasion, that the trustee was familiar with
the extent of decedent's own estate which was
approximately four and one-half times as
large as the trust estate, that her income from
the trust estate was approximately twelve
percent of her total income, that her income
exceeded her expenditures and she increased
the corpus of her own estate, and that the
trustee was personally familiar with her
manner of living. The Government objected
that such evidence was irrelevant and
immaterial to the legal issues involved here.
The government contends that the decedent
possessed at the time of her death a general
power of appointment over the corpus of the
trust created by her husband's will, and
further
that this general power of
appointment was not limited to an
ascertainable standard. Because of this the
government claims that the corpus of this
trust is includable in the gross estate of
decedent for federal estate *42 tax purposes
under § 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The applicable provisions of the statute are as
follows:
'§2041. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
'(a) In General.- The value of the gross
estate shall include the value of all property.'(2) Powers created after October 21, 1942.To the extent of any property with respect to
which the decedent has at the time of his
death a general power of appointment created
after October 21,1942, * * *.
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'(b) Definitions.- For purposes of subsection
(a)'(1) General power of appointment.- The
term 'general power of appointment' means a
power which is exercisable in favor of the
decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the
creditors of his estate; except that'(A) A power to consume, invade, or
appropriate property for the benefit of the
decedent which is limited by an ascertainable
standard relating to the health, education,
support, or maintenance of the decedent shall
not be deemed a general power of
appointment. '* * *' (26 U.S.C. 1958 Ed. §
2041)
Decedent's husband, B. Swayne Putts,
predeceased his wife on January 31, 1952. By
his will, executed on October 4, 1948, except
for personal effects given to his wife, he left
his entire estate to the Security-Peoples Trust
Company in trust. [FN1]
*43 We have appended the trust provisions
in full because we believe that this instrument
determines the problem confronting us,
whether this instrument confers *44 a
'general power of appointment' upon the
decedent, Edna Buhl Putts, which she
possessed at the time of her death.
The Treasury Regulations on Estate Tax
(1954 Code) § 20.204M(bXD, further defines a
power of appointment to include 'all powers
which are in substance and effect powers of
appointment regardless of the nomenclature
used in creating the power and regardless of
the local property law connotations.'
§
20.2041-l(c) of the Regulations defines a
general power of appointment as a power
'exercisable in favor of the decedent, his
estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his
estate.'
The legislative history of § 2041 may throw
some light on the intention of Congress in
adopting the above definition.
§ 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
originated in the Powers of Appointment Act
to orig. U.S. govt, works
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of 1951, which amended the prior Act of 1942.
TKe Senate Committee on Finance reported on
the bill (H.R.2084), Senate Report No. 382,
June 4, 1951:
'General Statement
This bill simplifies sections 811(f) and
1000(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, relating
to estate and gift tax on powers of
appointment.
The present law taxes all powers to appoint,
whether exercised or not, except two specified
classes of powers. One of these exempts
powers to appoint to certain near relatives.
The other is intended to exempt fiduciary
powers but has proved inadequate for the
purpose. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 1530)

Page 4
'The definition provides that, if certsrin
limitations or restrictions are present, a power
is not a general power even though exercisable
by the decedent in his own favor, (p. 1533)
'If the holder of a power is legally
accountable for its exercise of non-exercise, the
power is not deemed to be a general power.
However, a power which is exercisable in
favor of the holder, his estate, his creditors, or
the creditors of his estate, is not regarded as a
power for which the holder is legally
accountable.' (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 1534) 2
U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
Service, 82nd Congress 1st Session 1951, p.
1530 et seq.

'The provisions of the 1942 act, taxing the
exercise of limited powers of appointment and
the mere possession of unexercised powers,
were new to the Federal tax system. They
extended, or might be construed to extend, to
emergency powers to invade principal,
discretionary powers given to trustees, and
other types of powers which had theretofore
not been regarded as powers of appointment. *
* * (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 1531)

[1] From these statements, we draw the
conclusion that Congress intended to tax as
part of the estate of a decedent any property
over which the decedent had such a power of
control as to be able to apply it to his ovrci
benefit, or the benefit of his creditors, to
dispose of it by will, or to appoint it to his
estate or the creditors of his estate, or to
consume it without restriction. This fits the
ordinary definitions of what lawyers call a
'general power of appointment.' 41 Am.Jur.
'Powers', §§ 3, 4, pp. 807, 808; 72 C.J.S.
Powers § 1, p. 401.

'As to powers created after the passage of
the 1942 act, the bill subjects to estate tax the
possession of a general power to appointment,
whether or not the power is exercised, *45 and
subjects to gift tax the exercise or release of
such power. The bill defines a general power
of appointment as a power which is
exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate,
his creditors, or the creditors of his estate.
This includes a general beneficial power to
appoint by will. It also includes certain rights
to consume principal. It provides a test of
taxability which is simple, clear-cut, and easy
to apply. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 1531)

The Senate report indicates a different
treatment where the holder is not completely
free from legal control or restraint in the
disposition of the property. It states that
where the holder of the power is 'legally
accountable' for its exercise it is not deemed a
general power.
This can only refer to
fiduciary powers which are always subject to
the control of the courts and for which the
holder is always under a legal duty to account.
The Senate speaks of its intention, in passing
the Act, of making the intended exemption of
fiduciary powers in the prior law more
adequate.

'* * * Your committee believes that the most
important consideration is to make the law
simple and definite enough to be understood
and applied by the average lawyer, and that
the present bill will accomplish that purpose,
(p. 1531) 'Discussion of Specific Provisions

The decided cases which have construed this
section of the Internal Revenue Code, [FN2] as
well as those cases which construed the
provisions relating to powers of appointment
for determining the right to a charitable
deduction (§ 2055), and the right to the

Copr. © West 1995 No clai to orig. U.S. govt, works

*ZZZ

Page 5

238 F.Supp. 40
(Cite as: 238 F.Supp. 40, *45)
marital deduction (§ 2056), all resort to an
examination of the scope or breadth of the
power under local law.
'The initial step is to determine in light of
local law, the interest conveyed to the
decedent under this trust, i.e., the extent to
which, consonant sonant with testamentary
trust provision, the decedent could invade and
consume the principal.
Morgan v.
Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 60 S.Ct. 424, 84
L.Ed. 585 (1940); Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Ellis' Estate, 252 F.2d 109, 113 (3
Cir. 1958); Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F. *46
2d 598, 602 (90 A.L.R.2d 405) (3 Cir.1960).'
Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234, at pp. 238
and 239, (3d Cir. 1964).
[2] In Pennsylvania the cardinal rule of
construction is that the true intention of the
testator must govern, as that intention may be
found within the four cornes of the will. Fox
Appeal, 99 Pa. 382, Anderson's Estate, 243
Pa. 34, 89 A. 306; In re Reefer's Estate, 353
Pa. 281, 45 A.2d 31, 165 A.L.R. 1277.
'This is but one of the hundreds of
expressions of the cardinal rule in the
interpretation of wills to find the testator's
intent, and by that is meant his actual,
personal, individual intent, not a mere
presumptive conventional intent inferred from
the use of a set phrase or a familiar form of
words.' Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218 at p. 225,
43 A. 131 at 132 (1899).
With this in mind let us examine the
instrument by which this power was created.
From it we find the following:
1. Testator left his entire estate (except for
his personal effects) to the trust.
2.
Testator chose a sole, independent,
corporate trustee to administer the trust.
3. Testator provided detailed powers and
limitations over the Trustee in the
management of the trust assets, its allocations
of principal, capital growth, income,
accumulations and distribution.
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4.
Testator intended a long term
administration of this trust. Testator created
several successive beneficiaries; first his wife,
during her lifetime; then his daughter, for her
lifetime; then after his daughter's death, onehalf to his son-in-law for his lifetime; the
remaining one-half of the income to his
granddaughters until they become 45 years of
age; after the death of his son-in-law all the
income to the grandchildren; and if the
grandchildren should die before reaching age
45, then to issue of the grandchildren until
they become 21 years of age.
5. From the above we conclude that his
wife, Edna Buhl Putts, the within decedent,
was not the primary object of his bounty.
6. The power to invade is spoken of in terms
of 'advance portions of principal.'
Such
advances were to be made a charge and
deduction from any principal payment later
due to the recipient of said advancement or
any person claiming through or under the
same. Since no principal payment would be
due to either Testator's wife (the within
decedent); his daughter or his son-in-law, the
only conclusion that we can make from this
language is that the Testator did not
contemplate principal advancements in the
ordinary course of events to these income
beneficiaries (a factor which is demonstrated
by other evidence in this case outside the
Will).
7. Testator did not authorize invasion of
principal for all of the income beneficiaries, he
lists only his wife, his daughter and the
children of his daughter.
8. Testator directed that Trustee exercise its
discretion liberally for the beneficiaries
named, i.e., his wife, his daughter, and his
grandchildren, with no indication of
preference, but only for the specific purposes of
promoting their health, comfort, maintenance
or welfare.
9. Testator provided that none of the shares
of income or principal of the respective
beneficiaries should be in any way or manner
subject or liable to their anticipation, sale,
to orig. U.S. govt, works
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pledge, debts, contracts, engagements or
liabilities, and shall not be liable to
attachment or execution or sequestration
under any legal or equitable or other process.
10.
Finally, the power to make
advancements of principal is vested solely in
the independent corporate Trustee, at such
times, in such amounts, and for such purposes
as the Trustee in its discretion may deem
advisable.
The government argues that it is the
substance and effect of the transaction that
will govern, rather than the form.
'Technical considerations, niceties of the law
of trusts or conveyances, *47 or the legal
paraphernalia which inventive genius may
construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not
obscure the basic issue.' Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331, at p. 334, 60 S.Ct. 554, at p. 556,
84 L.Ed. 788(1940).
Under its view, 'a power to consume, invade,
or appropriate for the benefit of a decedent' is
a general power of appointment, taking these
words from the specific exception of §
2041(bXlXA) as to those powers limited to an
ascertainable standard. Without going further
into the question of ascertainable standard, we
must proceed with our inquiry into the effect
of the law of Pennsylvania on the language of
the will here.
The Government argues that 'under
Pennsylvania law a beneficiary can compel a
trustee to exercise its discretion to use the
trust property for the benefit of the
beneficiary.'
We have examined the
Pennsylvania cases cited by it and we do not
find that to be a complete statement of the law
of Pennsylvania. Rather the Pennsylvania
rule appears to be that in a proper case, after
considering the instrument creating the trust
and ascertaining from it the donor's or
testator's intentions; and considering the
circumstances calling for the exercise of
discretion, a Pennsylvania court can compel a
Trustee's exercise of discretion to carry out the
donor's or testator's intention, and conversely,
under the proper circumstances, it will uphold
Copr. ® West 1995 No c

Page

6

the refusal of the Trustee to make payments
under discretion granted it.
[3] First, we must distinguish between Ihe
cases where a legal trust estate has been
created and those cases where there is no legal
trust estate but rather where an individual
has been given an estate for life in real or
personal property with a power to use, occupy,
consume, sell or dispose of, with a gift over of
the remainder. In the latter class of cases the
Pennsylvania courts hold that the life tenant
is still under a legal obligation to exercise tliis
power in 'good faith.' Rumsey's Estate, 287
Pa. 448, 135 A. 119 (1926); 'honestly and
fairly,' Zumbro v. Zumbro, 69 Pa.Super. 600
(1910), and not to defeat the intention of the
testator, In re Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218, 43
A. 131 (1899).
>* * * ^e c o u r ^ c a n o n jy interfere to protect
the remaindermen when the widow attempts
to divert the fund from the purpose for which
it was bequeathed her.' Watson's Estate, 241
Pa. 271, at p. 280, 88 A. 433 at p. 436 (1913).
See also Powell's Estate, 340 Pa. 404, 17
A.2d 391 (1941).
In Tyson's Estate, supra, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, said, 191 Pa. at p. 225, 43 A.
at p. 132:
'The court below held that * * * the
personalty passed to his widow absolutely, on
the ground that a bequest of personalty, with
power to consume, sell, and dispose of, carries
an absolute and unrestricted title to it. That
such is the general rule cannot be disputed, ft
is not, however, a rule of law, but a rule of
construction in aid of reaching the intent of
the testator; and, where a different intent is
clear, the rule cannot be applied to defeat it.'
In Tyson's Estate, supra, it was held that
the widow's power did not include a power of
testamentary disposition to exclude the
remaindermen.
A stronger rule applies where the testator
has given title and possession of the trust
assets to an independent trustee with
to oiig. U.S. govt, works
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discretion to invade corpus for the benefit of
an income beneficiary. In such cases the
trustee in Pennsylvania is controlled in his
administration and disposition of assets by the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Fiduciaries
Act, Act of April 18, 1949, P.L. 512, 20 P.S. §
320. 101 et seq. This Act imposes duties of
accounting, control of the court, audit, notice
to parties in interest, and approval of
distributions. While the Federal tax cases
look to the substance rather than the form of a
transaction, nevertheless we see a difference
in substance rather than form where the
power or the discretion is imposed on one who
is subject *48 to control of the laws of
Pennsylvania governing trustees.
[4][5] An 'active' trust in Pennsylvania is
one in which active duties are imposed on the
trustee with respect to the control and
management of the subject matter. Bowman's
Estate, 332 Pa. 197, 2 A.2d 725 (1938). It
remains an active trust so long as it is
necessary that legal title to the assets remain
in the trustee to enable him to perform his
duties. Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 A. 380, 91 A.L.R. 99
(1933). When there is no longer any duty in
the trustee except to transfer over to the
beneficiary the income and the corpus of the
trust estate, the trust becomes a 'dry' trust,
Bergland's Estate, 372 Pa. 1, 92 A.2d 207
(1952); Hemphill's Estate, 180 Pa. 95, 36 A.
409 (1897), and the Statute of Uses as part of
the common law of Pennsylvania terminates
the trust. Sheridan v. Coughlin, 352 Pa. 226,
42 A.2d 618 (1945); Overbeck v. McHale, 354
Pa. 177, 47 A.2d 142 (1946); Sheasley's Trust,
366 Pa. 316, 77 A.2d 448 (1951).
[6] The government, in its brief, has cited a
number of Pennsylvania cases to support the
proposition that this decedent could have
compelled the trustee to pay over principal to
her without regard to her need or the assets of
her own estate, except only for the limitation
of the 'good faith' standard. The good faith
standard, in our view, has been limited to the
life estate cases. Our examination of the
Pennsylvania trustee cases reveals that the
Pennsylvania courts will only compel the
exercise of a trustee's discretion to invade
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principal when there has been a showing of
necessity and a clear direction in the trust
instrument.
In Walter's Case, 278 Pa. 421, 123 A. 408
(1923); Erisman v. Directors of the Poor, 47
Pa. 509 (1864); and Hohenshieldt's Estate, 105
Pa.Super. 18, 159 A. 71 (1932); the courts in
each case compelled the trustee to exercise his
discretion to invade the principal of a trust for
the benefit of the beneficiary who had been
declared an incompetent or a lunatic and was
being maintained at public expense in a public
institution.
In such cases Pennsylvania
statutes allow public bodies to recover this
expense of support from any property or estate
of the inmates.
In Walter's Case, supra, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court said with respect to the
discretion of a trustee:
'* * * his discretion is but a legal one, and,
whenever the law determines that a proper
case has arisen in which the trustee's
discretion should have been exercised on a
particular way, he will be constrained to act in
accordance therewith.' (278 Pa. at p. 423, 123
A. at p. 409).
In other cases such as Keller v. Commercial
Trust Co., 73 Pa.Super. 533 (1919); In re
Rudy's Estate, 71 Pa.Super. 448 (1918);
Hughes' Estate, 231 Pa. 475, 80 A. 1104
(1911); and Minnich v. People's Trust, 29
Pa.Super. 334 (1905), the Court authorized or
compelled the trustees to exercise discretion to
invade corpus to provide for the needs of
incompetents out of corpus of estates provided
for their benefit. In the minnich v. People's
Trust case, supra, the court held that the fact
that the beneficiary had other assets was
immaterial since the trust fund was expressly
created for the benefit of the incompetent. In
Hughes' Estate, supra, where the question of
the extent and quality of the provisions for the
beneficiary was involved, the Court stated.
'It is held in Steele's Appeal, 47 Pa. 437,
that a comfortable maintenance, measured by
the station, habits, and tastes of the testator
and the beneficiary, was intended, no more
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and no less, without extravagance either as to
place or material.' (231 Pa. at p. 477, 80 A. at
p. 1105).

judicial safeguarding of remainder interests to
assure compliance with the testator's intent as
to such interests.'

In both Hill v. Hill, 277 Pa. 165, 120 A. 775
(1923); and In re Brown's Appeal, 345 Pa. 373,
29 A.2d 52 (1942), the Court compelled the
exercise of the trustee's discretion to pay out
funds despite the availability of other assets
for the use of the beneficiaries because it *49
found an absolute mandate in the trust
instrument directing the use of the trust
estate for such purposes. There was also
evidence in these cases of the trustee
withholding distribution because of family
disagreements.

[7] In the present case, since there are a
series of further life beneficiaries aind
remaindermen, the trustee would be under a
strong duty to protect their interests in the
face of any request of the decedent for
invasion. Under the Pennsylvania decisions, a
Court would be bound to look into the assets of
her own estate, which were well known to the
trustee, who managed them.

But in the ordinary trust case the
Pennsylvania Courts will restrict and control
the trustee's exercise of discretion, and
support the trustee's discretion to refuse or
withhold invasion of principal. In Seacrist's
Estate, 362 Pa. 190, 66 A.2d 836 (1949), the
Court upheld the trustee's refusal to pay from
principal to a disabled son, stating:
To know the quality and quantity of
petitioner's private estate becomes very
material in order to determine his good faith
and his necessities, (p. 194, 66 A.2d p. 838).
In Briggs' Estate, 150 Pa.Super. 66, 27 A.2d
430 (1942), the Court held:
'* * * the exercise of discretion by trustees is
nevertheless subject to the limitation that
they must not act outside the bounds of
reasonable judgment.' (p. 67, 27 A.2dp. 433).
There, at the objection of a remainderman,
the Court held that the Trustees had abused
their discretion in making payment because
the beneficiary had other means of support
and would not personally benefit by payment.
As stated by Circuit Judge Kalodner in
Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598, at p. 603,
90 A.L.R.2d 405 (3rd Cir.1960):
'The rationale of the Pennsylvania decisions,
cited in Ellis' Estate (252 F.2d 109), limiting a
life tenant's withdrawals from principal, is the
Copr. © West 1995 No c

[8] The fact that this decedent had an estate
of her own almost five times as great as that
of her husband would not only compel the
trustee to resist her request for invasion
except for clear necessity, but it would also
guide the court in any attempt to determine
the testator's intent. The extent of testator's
wife's personal estate would be a strong factor
in his plan for the disposition of his own estate
and the court may look to such extrinsic and
contemporaneous circumstances to ascertain
his intent. Scholler Trust, 403 Pa. 97, 169
A.2d 554 (1961); Wolters' Estate, 359 Pa. 520,
59 A.2d 147 (1948).
The cases in which the Federal Courts have
construed 2041 fall into two classes; those
involving the question of whether decedent
held a general power under the law, and thos-e
which, after finding that decedent possessed a
power to appoint to himself, seek to find if it i s
limited by an ascertainable standard relating
to
health,
education,
support
and
maintenance.
[9][10] Not every case must meet the
'ascertainable standards' test, but only those
in which there is first shown a power in the
decedent to transfer or appropriate to himself.
Where such power is held by the decedent, it
may still result in an exception to taxation
where the power of decedent is limited by the
'ascertainable standards.' If the power of the
decedent is not of the standard defined by the
Code as a 'general power', as measured by
state law, we need not consider the
'ascertainable standards' measure.
to orig. U.S. govt, works
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In Pittsfield National Bank v. United
States, 181 F.Supp. 851 (D.Mass.1960), where
testatrix created a trust with an independent
corporate
trustee,
with
children
as
remaindermen, giving her husband a life
income, 'together with all or such part of the
principal of same as he may from time to time
request, he to be the sole judge of his needs,'
the *50 court held that the word 'needs' was a
limitation because under local law husband
only had the power to invade corpus in the
event he was in financial or physical need.
The court held that the words 'his needs'
established an ascertainable standard. The
court further paid regard to the evidence that
Testatrix clearly intended to provide for
remaindermen and that the husband had
substantial property of his own so that it was
unlikely that the corpus would be invaded.

surviving spouse who has a life estate must
also have a power to appoint which is
exercisable in all events.
Hoffman v.
McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir.1960). In
other words, we believe that the 'general
power of appointment' which is the standard
for determining the inclusion of assets in the
gross estate of a decedent under § 2041 is a
power of the same kind and quality as the
'power of appointment exercisable in all
events' in the surviving spouse which qualifies
the assets for the marital deduction under §
2056.

In Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234 (3d
Cir.1964) affirming 215 F.Supp.
513
(E.D.Pa.1963), the Court of Appeals held that
under Pennsylvania law, a beneficiary who
was also the trustee, who had the power to
appropriate to herself for her own 'benefit',
was not limited to the ascertainable standard,
particularly where 'the will emphatically
reveals that the (beneficiary and trustee) (is)
intended to be the main objects of the
testatrix's bounty.' (330 F.2d p. 239, quoting
from the District Court's opinion 215 F.Supp.
at p. 517).

'Cases under § 2056 have only limited
relevance since the question which arises is
not whether an ascertainable standard exists
but whether any standard exists. In order to
qualify for the marital deduction, the
surviving spouse must have an unqualified
power to appoint the principal to herself
during her lifetime. The power must be one
that may be exercised 'in all events."

The remainder of the Federal Court
decisions under § 2041 all turn on whether the
power to invade was a general or a limited
power under applicable local law. [FN3]
While the analogy between the § 2041
'general power' cases and the § 2055
'charitable deduction' cases has frequently
been discussed in connection with the
determination of the 'ascertainable standard',
despite the different qualities which each
attempts to define, we are of the opinion that
decisions of the § 2056 cases, concerning the
marital deduction, have a closer parallel to
the interpretation of § 2041.
[11][12] Section 2056(bX5) requires as a test
of eligibility for the marital deduction that the

In discussing the analogy of ascertainable
standards in a § 2041 and § 2055 case, Judge
Freedman stated in Strite v. McGinnes, 215
F.Supp. 513 at page 514 (note 2)
(E.D.Pa.1963):

The wording of the two Code sections
strengthens our belief that the powers of
appointment under § 2041 and § 2056 are
powers of the same kind and quality.
'§ 2041(b) Definition
'(1) General Power of Appointment.- The
term 'general power of appointment' means a
power which is exercisable in favor of the
decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the
creditors of his estate.'
'§ 2056(bX5) Life estate with power of
appointment in the surviving spouse.--In the
case of an interest in property passing from
the decedent, if his surviving spouse is
entitled for life to all the income from the
entire interest, or * * * a specific portion
thereof * * * with power in the surviving
spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such
specific portion (exercisable in favor of such
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surviving spouse, or of the estate of such
surviving spouse, or in favor of either,
whether or not in *51 each case the power is
exercisable in favor of others), and with no
power in any other person to appoint any part
of the interest, or such specific portion, to any
person other than the surviving spouse'(A) the interest of such portion thereof so
passing shall, for purposes of subsection (a), be
considered as passing to the surviving spouse,
* ** >
[13] Thus if a spouse has a 'general power of
appointment' as defined in Section 2041(bXl)
over property in which she has a life estate, it
would qualify for the marital deduction of §
2056. Conversely, we believe that if she has no
power to appoint to herself exercisable in all
events under the terms of § 2056, she has no
'general power of appointment' in the terms of
§ 2041(bXD.
Following this line of reasoning we may
consider two cases involving § 2056 decided in
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, both of which arose in
Pennsylvania and both of which were
ultimately
determined
under
the
Pennsylvania law applicable.
In Commissioner v. Ellis's Estate, 252 F.2d
109 (3rd Cir.1958), decedent left his estate in
trust, $5,000 per annum to be payable to his
wife for life. He further provides that should
his wife 'require' sums in excess of $5,000 per
annum, 'she, and she alone, shall be the judge
of how much shall be required,' the same
should be paid to her, any deficiency of income
to be supplied out of principal. On the death
of his wife there were gifts of remainders, onehalf to the wife's estate, one-half to the
children. The will also contained a spendthrift
clause preserving the estate from pledge,
assignment, anticipation, debts, or liabilities
of any beneficiary. The estate claimed a
marital deduction for assets of the trust. Chief
Judge Biggs says, 252 F.2d at p. 113:
'* * * We come then to the issue as to what
was the exact nature of the power given Mrs.
Ellis over the residuary estate during her

lifetime.
'The law of Pennsylvania must be applied to
determine what was the nature of the power
Mrs.
Ellis
possessed.
Morgan
v.
Commissioner, 1939, 309 U.S. 78, 626, 60
S.Ct. 424, 84 L.Ed. 585, 1035; Helvering v.
Stuart, 1942, 317 U.S. 154, 63 S.Ct. 140, 87
L.Ed. 154 * * *.'
Chief Judge Biggs first determines that the
power to consume corpus for herself under
Pennsylvania law was limited by the 'good
faith' standard which the Pennsylvania courts
have imposed on life tenants.
Rumsey's
Estate, 287 Pa. 448, 135 A. 119 (1926);
Zumbro v. Zumbro, 69 Pa.Super. 600 (1918);
Degenkolv v. Daube, 143 Pa.Super. 579, 18
A.2d 464 (1941); Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218,
43 A. 131 (1899).
Secondly,
decedent
had
named
remaindermen.
Therefore, the court
concluded that she had no power to appoint by
will.
The court also found that there was no
merger of a life estate and the one-half
remainder given the life tenant's estate here
under the general Pennsylvania rule (Conley's
Estate, 197 Pa. 291, 47 A. 238 (1900), because
of the spendthrift provision of the will.
'* * * The Pennsylvania courts jealously
uphold spendthrift trusts and see to it that the
will of the testator is given effect as tie
expressed it. In re Bosler's Estate, 1954, 378
Pa. 333, 107 A.2d 443, 444. In the cited case
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated
categorically that 'A life estate under a
spendthrift trust will not coalesce or merge
with an estate in remainder,' citing In re
Moser's Estate, 1921, 270 Pa. 217, 113 A.
199.'(252 F.2d at page 114).
The conclusion of Chief Judge Biggs was
therefore that one-half of the trust *52 estate
which passed to other remaindermen, and to
which the life tenant's power to consume was
limited by the good faith standard and by the
spendthrift provisions, did not qualify for the
marital deduction. In other words the widow
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did not possess a 'general power of
appointment' as to that one-half of the trust
estate. (The other half went to her estate by
the terms of the will).
A second case of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit which also
applies the Pennsylvania law to a § 2056
situation is Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d
598, (3rd Cir. 1960). Here again the Court
considered the scope of the power to invade
principal under a different set of testamentary
directions. The Testator gave his wife 'the
right to use and spend any or all of the
principal of my said estate, if she so desires,
and upon her request or requests made to
(trustees) they shall pay to her from time to
time any part of the principal of my estate she
may desire and said trust shall cease as to
that part of the principal so paid to her. * * *.'
The Court of Appeals (Kalodner, C.J.) said,
277 F.2d at p. 603:
'It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
state any more explicitly an intent to confer
'an unrestricted power exercisable at any time
during her life to use all or any part of the
principal of the decedent's trust estate.'
Judge Kalodner cites a number of
Pennsylvania cases where the courts held the
testator's intention to be that the beneficiary's
demand was the sole requirement for invasion
of principal. [FN4] In none of these cases is
there any qualification, the beneficiary may
use the proceeds for whatever purpose she sees
fit, the trustee has no discretion but to pay
over whatever is demanded.
The cases fall into the classification
described in Scott on Trusts, § 128.3,
'Discretionary Trusts,' p. 67:
'In such a case the amount to which the life
beneficiary is entitled depends wholly upon
his own desires, and the trustee has no
discretion to withhold.'
The court in Hoffman v. McGinnes, supra,
held that this power satisfied the
requirements for the marital deduction. It
Copr. © West 1995 No c
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distinguished the case from Commissioner v.
Ellis, supra, by stating:
>* * * Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Ellis' Estate, supra, where it was held that a
provision in the decedent's will authorizing
the surviving wife's withdrawal from principal
of such sums as she 'should require's did not
vest in her a power of appointment, since
under Pennsylvania law the surviving wife '*
* * under the terms of the will did not possess
an 'unlimited' power to invade the corpus or
appoint the corpus to herself as unqualified
owner', in view of the will's creation of
'remainder' (252 F.2d 113) interests.' 277 F.2d
598, at p. 600.
It may be of interest to note the hope of the
Senate Finance Committee (supra) that:
'The most important consideration is to
make the law simple and definite enough to be
understood and applied by the average lawyer,
and that the present bill will accomplish that
purpose.'
Not only the average lawyer, but the writers
in the field of estate planning and estate
taxation have placed a uniform construction
on § 2041. [FN5]
*53 [14] We are, therefore, of the opinion
that the decedent, Edna Buhl Putts, did not
possess at the time of her death a general
power of appointment over the assets in the
trust estate established under the will of her
husband, B. Swayne Putts, held by the
trustee, Security-Peoples Trust Company. We
do not find that she held any power
exercisable in her favor, or in favor of her
estate, her creditors, or the creditors of her
estate. We find that title and possession of the
trust assets was in the hands of an
independent corporate trustee, which under
the law of Pennsylvania was legally
accountable for its administration, not only to
the decedent, but to successive life income
beneficiaries and remaindermen. We find that
the Trustee alone was vested with the
discretion to make invasion of principal, which
discretion had to be exercised reasonably, and
solely for the benefit of the named
to orig. U.S. govt, works
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beneficiaries, and with regards to the needs
and the other available assets of such
beneficiary, and with regard to the protection
of interests of other future beneficiaries and
remaindermen. The decedent had no power to
make an appointment, gift, transfer or
testamentary disposition of any part of the
trust assets to herself or her estate, and the
assets were protected from the pledge,
encumbrance, sale, anticipation, debts and
liabilities of decedent by the testator's
spendthrift provision.
An appropriate order will be entered.
FN1. The relevant portions of the will are:
'ARTICLE THIRD 'I give, devise and bequeath all
the rest, residue and remainder of my Estate, real,
personal and mixed, of whatsoever kind, nature and
description, wheresoever situated, unto the
SECURITY-PEOPLES TRUST COMPANY, a
banking corporation located at Erie, Pennsylvania,
IN TRUST, nevertheless for the use and benefit of
the beneficiaries hereinafter named in the manner
hereinafter designated. 'ARTICLE FOURTH 'My
executor while in possession and control of my
Estate, and thereafter my Trustee, is hereby
authorized to retain, hold, possess, manage,
control, sell, convey, encumber, lease, invest and
reinvest, and successively invest and reinvest the
assets thereof according to its sole judgment and
discretion, in such securities or other property,
personal or real, and upon such terms and for such
length of time, as to it shall seem advisable, without
any limitation upon its power or authority so to do,
either by statute or otherwise. I further authorize
my Trustee to charge all premiums on investments
against principal, and to credit all discounts on
investments to principal.
Any and all cash
dividends, whether ordinary or extraordinary or
special, shall be considered as income; and any and
all stock dividends, rights, warrants, or other things
of value, shall be considered as corpus and added to
the principal of the estate. Any profit realized from
the sale of any security or investment shall be
considered as corpus and added to the principal of
the trust, and likewise any loss on any such sale
shall be deducted from the principal and not from
the income of the Trust. The Trustee, in its
discretion, may apportion between principal and
income any expenditure which in its opinion should
be apportioned, notwithstanding any rule or any

provision hereof to the contrary. Tn any case in
which the Trustee is required to divide the principal
of the estate in parts or shares or to distribute the
same, it is hereby authorized and empowered in its
sole discretion to make division or distribution in
kind or partly in kind and party in money. The
judgment of the Trustee concerning values for the
purpose of such division or distribution of property
or securities shall be binding and conclusive on all
persons interested therein. My trustee may
accumulate such portion of the income payable to
any minor beneficiaries that may be entitled to
participate hereunder as my Trustee in its discretion
may deed (deem) advisable 'ARTICLE FIFTH
'Section 1. In the event that my wife, EDNA
BUHL PUTTS, is living at the time of my death,
my Trustee shall pay the income from the Trust
Estate in convenient installments unto her during the
term of her natural life. 'Section 2. On the death
of my said wife, EDNA BUHL PUTTS, or on my
death in the event my said wife shall predecease
me, my trustee shall pay the income from the Tj-ust
Estate in convenient installments unto my daughter,
CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, during the term of
her natural life. 'Section 3. On the death of my
daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, or in the
event that she shall predecease me, or die before
my wife, EDNA BUHL PUTTS, then on my death
or the death of my said wife, EDNA BUHL
PUTTS, which ever shall last occur, my Trustee
shall pay the income from the Trust Estate in
convenient installments as follows, to wit: one-half
(1/2) thereof unto my son-in-law, HENRY W.
BUHL, during the term of his natural life, and onehalf (1/2) thereof equally to or for the use of the
children of my daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS
BUHL, to wit: LOIS CHRISTENE BUHL,
NANCY ANNE BUHL, and any other children of
my said daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL,
that may be hereafter born or adopted until they
respectively become forty-five (45) years of age.
Should my son-in-law, HENRY W. BUHL, not be
living at the time he would otherwise have been
entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the net income
of the Trust Estate under the foregoing provisions,
or on his death if the same should occur subsequent
thereto, I direct that my Trustee shall pay all of the
income from the Trust Estate to or for the use of
LOIS CHRISTENE BUHL, NANCY ANNE
BUHL, and any other children of my said daughter,
CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, that may be hereafter
born or adopted. As the children of my daughter,
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CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, respectively become
forty-five (45) years of age, or, if they or either of
them have become forty-five (45) years of age at or
prior to the time of the happening of a contingency
which would entitle said child or children unto onehalf (1/2) or all of the income from the Trust
Estate, I direct that the principal of the Trust Estate
from which said child or children would otherwise
be entitled to receive income shall be paid over to
said child or children free and clear of the terms
hereof. 'Section 4. In the event that any of the
children of my daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS
BUHL, shall die leaving issue her surviving, either
before or after becoming entitled to receive income
or principal under the terms of this my Will, I give,
devise and bequeath the shares of income and
principal to which such decedent would have been
entitled if living, unto her issue, per stirpes, or, if
such decedent shall leave no issue her surviving, I
give, devise, and bequeath her shares of income
and principal hereunder unto the survivor or
survivors of said children, with the surviving issue
of any who may then be deceased taking per stirpes
the share to which their parent would have been
entitled if living. On becoming twenty-one (21)
years of age, said issue of my daughter's children
shall receive their share of principal and
accumulated income of the Trust Estate free and
clear of the terms hereof. 'Section 5. If the
survivor of the children of my daughter,
CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, and their issue shall
die without leaving issue surviving either before or
after becoming entitled to receive income and/or
principal under the terms of this my Will, but prior
to said Trust Estate being completely distributed, I
give, devise and bequeath the portions of the Trust
Estate from which said children or their issue would
have been entitled to receive income or principal
therefrom if living, as follows: to wit: Two-thirds
(2/3) thereof unto the heirs-at-law of my wife,
EDNA BUHL PUTTS, as determined by the
Intestate Laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania existing at said time or times, and
one-third (1/3) thereof unto my heirs-at-law as
determined by said Laws. 'Section 6. I direct that
the gifts of principal of the Trust Estate herein made
shall include also accumulated income thereon;
further, that the words, 'children and 'issue' as
herein used shall include adopted as well as natural
children and issue and that adopted children and
their issue shall be entitled to participate hereunder
to the same extent as if natural children or issue of

the persons herein named or described. 'ARTICLE
SIXTH T hereby authorize my Trustee to advance
portions of the principal of the Trust Estate to or for
the use or benefit of the following beneficiaries of
income therefrom, to wit, my wife, EDNA BUHL
PUTTS, my daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS
BUHL, and children and issue of my said daughter,
CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, during the periods in
which said beneficiaries shall be entitled to receive
income, at such times, in such amounts, and for
such purposes as my Trustee in its discretion may
deem advisable. I direct that my Trustee shall
exercise liberally the power to advance principal
herein conferred to promote the health, comfort,
maintenance or welfare of the income beneficiaries
hereinabove referred to.
Such principal
advancements, when made, shall be charged to and
deducted from any principal payment later due
hereunder to the recipient of said advancement or to
any person claiming under or through the same.
Prior to such principal distribution, said
advancements shall be chargeable against the
portion of the Trust Estate from which the recipient
thereof or persons thereunder claiming shall be
entitled to receive income and shall not diminish the
principal from which income may be due
concurrent beneficiaries under the terms hereof.
'ARTICLE SEVENTH 'None of the shares of
income or principal by this instrument given to or
directed to be held for the use and benefit of the
several and respective beneficiaries
herein
specified, shall be in any way or manner subject or
liable to their or any of their anticipation, sale,
pledge, debts, contracts, engagements, or liabilities,
and shall not be subject or liable to attachment or
execution or sequestration under any legal or
equitable or other process. 'ARTICLE EIGHTH
'During the administration of my Estate my
Executor shall disburse the income received from
investments to the person or persons who would be
entitled thereto if my estate were then fully
administered, and may make expenditures for
obligations and expenses of my estate from the
principal assets thereof.
'ARTICLE NINTH T
hereby nominate, constitute, and appoint the
SECURITY-PEOPLES TRUST COMPANY, of
Erie, Pennsylvania, as Executor of this my Last
Will and Testament and Testamentary Guardian of
the estates of any minors entitles to participate
hereunder.'
FN2. Phinney v. Kay, 275 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.
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I960); Barritt v. Tomlinson, 129 F.Supp. 642
(S.D.Fla.1955); Snyder v. United States, 203
F.Supp. 195 (W.D.Ky.1962); Pittsfield Nat. Bank
v. United States, 181 F.Supp. 851 (D.Mass. 1960);
Strite
v.
McGinnes,
215
F.Supp.
513
(E.D.Pa.1963), Affd. 3 Cir., 330 F.2d 234, Cert.
Den. 379 U.S. 836, 85 S.Ct. 69, Rehearing Denied
379 U.S. 910, 85 S.Ct. 185 (3rd Cir. 1964).
FN3. Phinney v. Kay, 275 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.
1960); Barritt v. Tomlinson, 129 F.Supp. 642
(S.D.Fla.1955); Snyder v. United States, 203
F.Supp. 195 (W.D.Ky.1962).
FN4. Keen's Estate, 80 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 377
(1951); Arrott's Estate, 36 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 546
(1939); Estate of George M. Morriss, 26
Dauph.Co. 137(1922).
FN5. 'If the power of invasion is given to the
trustee and not to the beneficiary, there are no
estate or gift tax consequences to the beneficiary.'
Lifetime and Testamentary Estate Planning in
Pennsylvania, Edward M. Davis American Law
Institute 1958 (p. 94). (See also 'Lifetime and
Testamentary Estate Planning' Harrison Tweed and
William Parsons, Am.Law Inst.) 'Therefore where
it is intended that the principal of the trust may be
invaded for the benefit of the income beneficiaries,
the power to invade should be reposed in the
discretion of those trustees who are not
beneficiaries.'
2 Polisher, Estate Planning and
Estate Tax Saving, p. 494. '* * * it is clear that
giving the wife power over her husband's property
will often result in income, gift and estate tax
problems for her. Clearly, the surest way to avoid
such problems is to name some other person trustee
and to give the widow no powers over the
husband's property.' Andrew H. Cox 'Income and
Estate Tax Aspects of Surviving Spouse Beneficiary
Serving as Executor-Trustee.'; 22 Institute on
Federal Taxation (p. 1041) New York University
1964. See also 'Trusts in Estate Planning' by
Sidney C. Winton, and Sherwin Kamin in Lasser
'Estate Tax Techniques.' Vol. 2, p. 1300.

END OF DOCUMENT
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NCNB NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA tl
k/a The Exchange National Bank of
Tampa, as
Trustee of the Florence E. Hoard Trust,
Appellant,
v.
Richard L. SHANABERGER, as Guardian
of the Property of Mark E. Shanaberger,
incapacitated, Appellee.
No. 92-01226.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Second District.
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Even an unlimited power of invasion of a trust
is subject to implied limitations to protect the
remaindermen.
[41 TRUSTS <&* 276
390k276
Trustee did not abuse its discretion in
requesting information of income beneficiary's
outside sources of income prior to satisfying
the beneficiary's trust invasion demand for his
nursing home and related medical expenses;
there was no evidence that the trustee acted
dishonestly, arbitrarily or from improper
motive.

March 19, 1993.
Son and guardian of income beneficiary
requested that trustee invade principal of
trust for payment of income beneficiary's
nursing home expenses and related charges.
Trustee requested information of beneficiary's
outside sources of income prior to granting the
beneficiary's principal invasion demand. The
Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Frank H.
White, J., entered declaratory judgment in
determining that trustee had abused its
discretion, and trustee appealed. The District
Court of Appeal, Ryder, Acting C. J., held that
trustee did not abuse its discretion in
requesting information of income beneficiary's
outside sources of income prior to satisfying
the beneficiary's trust invasion demand for his
nursing home and related medical expenses.
Reversed and remanded.
[1] TRUSTS <&= 111
390kl77
Trustee's exercise of its discretion is not
subject to control by court except to prevent an
abuse of discretion.
[21 TRUSTS <S^ 177
390kl77
Trustee is always subject to accountability to
remaindermen where discretion is improperly,
arbitrarily or capriciously exercised.
[3] TRUSTS &* 276
390k276

*96 Stacy D. Blank and Steven L. Brannock
of Holland & Knight, Tampa, for appellant.
Mark I.
appellee.

Shames,

St.

Petersburg,

for

RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
NCNB National Bank of Florida, as Trustee
of the Florence E. Hoard Trust, *97 disputes
the trial court's declaratory judgment
determining that the trustee had abused its
discretion by requiring information as to other
sources of income from Mark E. Shanaberger,
Sr. prior to satisfying his trust principal
invasion demand for his nursing home and
related medical expense. Because we hold
that the trustee must under these
circumstances look to outside resources to
evaluate in its sole discretion what is
"necessary" in order to invade the principal,
we reverse.
NCNB is the trustee of the Florence E.
Hoard Trust which names Mark E.
Shanaberger, Sr. as the income beneficiary
and directs the trustee to pay the trust's
income to him for his life. The trust further
provides that upon the income beneficiary's
death, two remainder trusts are to be created
for the benefit of Hoard's nieces. Like the
income beneficiary, the nieces are to receive
the trust income until their deaths, after
which the trust principal is to be distributed to
their surviving children.
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Under the trust, NCNB's obligation to pay
the income of the trust to Mark is mandatory,
not discretionary. The trust also provides that
the trustee "may invade the principal of the
trust estate and pay from the said principal so
much of it as in the sole discretion of the
Trustee
is necessary
for the
care,
maintenance, support and medical attention"
of Mark Shanaberger.
The trust further
allows that principal invasions may be made
by the trustee in its sole discretion. The trust,
however, set no criteria in making the
necessity determination.
But the trust
prohibits the trustee from paying any amounts
for the maintenance, support or care of any
heirs or dependents of Mark Shanaberger.
The parties stipulated that the settlor,
Florence Hoard, and Mark Shanaberger had a
close, personal relationship that began in the
early 1940,s. At all times relevant to the
execution of the Hoard trusts, amendments,
wills and codicil, both parties had full
knowledge of each other's respective financial
situation, and, as part of that knowledge,
Hoard knew that Shanaberger's assets and
income at that time exceeded her own and
were sufficient to meet any of his anticipated
medical
costs
and
expenses
without
contribution from her trust funds. The parties
also stipulated that due to his age and
condition, Mark Shanaberger required nursing
home care and has resided in a nursing home
in Pennsylvania since June 1989.
In July 1989, Richard E. Shanaberger, the
son and guardian of Mark Shanaberger,
requested NCNB to invade the principal of the
trust for the payment of the senior
Shanaberger's nursing home expenses and
related charges.
The expenses averaged
$3,100.00 each month. The initial request
was for a principal invasion in the amount of
$6,245.27. At that time, the entire principal
of the trust was approximately $120,000.00.
NCNB concluded that it could unconditionally
invade the trust principal in the amount of
$2,500.00, but it was concerned that repeated
requests to invade principal for the payment of
Shanaberger's nursing home expenses would
deplete the trust. Before invading principal to
any greater extent, NCNB requested

2

information regarding Mark Shanaberger's
other sources of income in an effort to
reasonably evaluate whether the invasion was
necessary for his care.
Richard Shanaberger refused to provide that
information and initiated this litigation,
claiming that NCNB abused its discretion by
requesting information regarding outside
sources of income prior to satisfying his
invasion request in full. At trial, it was
disclosed that information of outside sources of
income was within Richard Shanaberger's
knowledge. After the trial court's ruling,
Richard Shanaberger served an additional
demand on NCNB for $64,425.13. This timely
appeal ensued.
The sole issue presented to this court is
whether the trustee's request for information
of outside sources of income was an abuse of
discretion. Whether, after considering such
information, the trustee abuses its discretion
in later approving or denying a trust principal
invasion is not before the court. Because we
need not consider now the settlor's intent
concerning principal invasions, we review only
the trustee's scope of discretion.
[1][2][3] A trustee's exercise of its discretion
is not subject to control by the court *98
except to prevent an abuse of discretion.
Sarasota Bank & Trust Co. v. Rietz, 297 So.2d
91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). A trustee is always
subject to accountability to remaindermen
where discretion is improperly, arbitrarily or
capriciously exercised. Mesler v. Holly, 318
So.2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Even an
unlimited power of invasion is subject to
implied
limitations
to
protect
the
remaindermen. Mesler.
[4] NCNB has never denied the principal
invasion request, but only determined in its
sole discretion that it could unconditionally
distribute only the sum of $2,500.00. The
trustee concluded that any additional
principal invasion would require consideration
of the income beneficiary's other sources of
income to make an informed decision whether
it was necessary for his care, maintenance and
medical attention. Our review of the record
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discloses no evidence that the trustee acted
dishonestly, arbitrarily or from an improper
motive. Absent other criteria upon which to
base a decision that a principal invasion is
necessary, we hold that the trustee's request
was reasonable. For the foregoing reasons, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
FRANK and PARKER, JJ., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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In the Matter of the Construction of the
WILL of Jacob FLYER, Deceased.
Phyllis KAVETT, as Trustee, et al.,
Appellants,
v.
Jeannette G. LEAVITT, as Committee of
the Incompetent, Elsie Flyer, et al.,
Respondents.
Court of Appeals of New York.
Jan. 23,1969.
Proceeding to construe will with respect to
power of trustee to invade principal. The
Surrogate's
Court
of Bronx
County,
Christopher C. McGrath, S., entered decree
requiring trustee to invade corpus for benefit
of incompetent widow without regard to her
private resources and an appeal was taken.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
in the First Judicial Department, 29 A.D.2d 8,
284 N.Y.S.2d 891, affirmed by a divided court
and there was an appeal. The Court of
Appeals, Fuld, C.J., held that upon
considering surrounding circumstances and
reading as a whole will which testator had
executed after his wife had become incurably
ill and after he had used her social security
payments for her support, trustee who was
given an absolute discretion to invade
principal for benefit of wife if income were
insufficient for wife's support was privileged
to
consider
beneficiary's
independent
resources including social security benefits
before deciding to invade principal.
Order appealed from reversed and matter
remitted for further proceedings.
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which must control, and court educes his
design not only from language employed but
from sympathetic reading of will as an
entirety while considering circumstances
under which provisions were framed.
[2] WILLS <S=* 684.10(5)
409k684.10(5)
Trustee, particularly when given uncontrolled
discretion to invade principal, may before
deciding to effect an invasion, take into
account beneficiary's independent resources
where there is no absolute gift of principal and
testator intends that invasion of principal be
dependent upon needs or requirements of the
beneficiary.
[3] WILLS <§^ 684.2(5)
409k684.2(5)
Trustee may not consider beneficiary's income
before deciding to effect an invasion of
principal where testator attached no condition
of need and intended that gift of principal be
as broad as gift of interest and the first
inseparable from the other.
[4] WILLS <&> 684.10(5)
409k684.10(5)
Upon considering surrounding circumstances
and reading as a whole will which testator had
executed after his wife had become incurably
ill and after he had used her social security
payments for her support, trustee who was
given an absolute discretion to invade
principal for benefit of wife if income were
insufficient for wife's support was privileged
to
consider
beneficiary's
independent
resources including social security benefits
before deciding to invade principal.

Scileppi andBreitel, JJ., dissented.
[11 WILLS < ^ 684.2(5)
409k684.2(5)
In determining whether trustee is privileged
to consider beneficiary's independent income
before effecting an invasion of principal the
language of will may not be entirely
disregarded but, as in every case in which a
will is ambiguous or silent with respect to a
controverted matter, it is testator's intent
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***957 **718 *580 Herbert Monte Levy,
New York City, for appellants.
*581 Richard E. Leavitt, Brooklyn, for
Jeannette G. Leavitt, respondent.
•582FULD, Chief Judge.
In this proceeding to construe a will, we are
presented with the question whether a **719
trustee, vested with sole and absolute
orig. U.S. govt, works
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discretion to invade the principal of the trust
for the support of the life beneficiary, may
take the latter's private resources into account
before deciding to effect an invasion.
The testator, Jacob Flyer, died in August of
1964. He was survived by three daughters of
a deceased first wife and by a second spouse,
Elsie, whom he had married in 1945. In 1960,
the latter suffered a severe stroke which left
her a hopeless and incurable invalid. Soon
thereafter, the testator executed his will
giving two thirds of his estate outright--or his
entire estate if his wife predeceased him-to
his three children in ***958 equal shares.
Out of the last third, 'or the sum of $20,000,
whichever is greater,' he created a trust for
his widow, with the remainder to be equally
divided at her death among the three
daughters. The estate was valued at over
$50,000.
The particular clause which prompted the
present construction proceeding, after reciting
that one third of the testator's estate was to be
given in trust to one of his daughters as
trustee 'to pay to (his) wife Elsie or her
representative, or to use for (her) benefit * * *
the income thereof for (her) life', went on to
provide that,
'if such income be insufficient for the
support and maintenance of Elsie, my
Trustee shall so pay or use from principal
sufficient moneys to provide for Elsie's
support and maintenance, in the sole,
absolute and uncontrolled discretion of the
Trustee.
If, in the sole, absolute and
uncontrolled discretion of the Trustee, any
part of the net income thereof need not be
used for the support and maintenance of my
said wife, such part of the income shall be
added to and become part of the principal of
the trust estate.'[FNl]
FN1 If any daughter died before the widow, the
testator provided, that daughter's share was to be
held in trust for her children until they reached the
age of 21 and, again, the trustee was given 'sole,
uncontrolled and absolute discretion' to invade the
principal for their benefit or to add to it any income
which remained unused.
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*583 The testator's wife spent virtually the
entire four-year period, between the execution
of the will by her husband and his death, in
hospitals and nursing homes and was finally
confined to Pilgrim State Hospital after she
had attempted suicide. She has a sister-who
was appointed her committee in 1965--and a
daughter by a previous marriage. Her assets,
in addition to the trust set up for her benefit,
consist of cash and personal property, worth
about $10,000, and income from social security
payments amounting to about $1,800 a year.
There is due and unpaid a hospital bill of
more than $10,000. The petitioner in this
construction proceeding--the incompetent's
sister who, as noted, is her committeecontends that the testator 'intended' an
absolute gift of both income and principal to
his widow, without regard to her independent
resources, and that, accordingly, the trustee
should be required to pay that bill as well as
any others which may be incurred. The
trustee, one of the testator's daughters, finds
no such requirement in the will. It is her
position that her father, though desiring to
provide for his widow's maintenance out of
principal in case of necessity, intended her
private income to be used and, in support of
this claim, calls attention to the fact that the
testator had actually used his wife's social
security moneys in paying her hospital bills
during his lifetime.
The Surrogate agreed with the petitioner,
concluding that the trustee was required to
pay all amounts necessary for the widow's
support and ***959 maintenance out of both
principal and income 'without regard to (her)
private resources'.
A closely divided
Appellate Division affirmed. The minority
took the view that it was clear from the will,
as well as from the circumstances existing
between the time of its execution **720 and
the testator's death, that he intended his
widow's independent income to be applied
toward her support. If the result be otherwise,
Justice McGivern pointed out in his dissenting
opinion,
'The corpus will be eroded--for as it
decreases, its yield will correspondingly
diminish, to the point of destruction, if the
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widow lives long enough. And an injury is
wrought to the children of the testator. All
the while, the social security payments of
the widow here will batten and pointlessly
accumulate. Social security was devised to
allay the fears and mitigate the *584
privations of old age, not to multiply for
some one else, other than the subject, to
enjoy.' (29 A.D.2d 8, 11, 284 N.Y.S.2d 891,
894.)
We agree with the dissenting justices of the
Appellate Division that the present case falls
within the decisions holding that a trustee is
privileged to consider the beneficiary's
independent income before effecting an
invasion of principal.
[1] Although the decisions in this area of the
law place emphasis on the precise verbiage
found in the provision creating the trust, close
analysis reveals that they take into
consideration more than such verbiage alone
in seeking to ascertain the testator's intent.
The language may not, of course, be entirely
disregarded but, as in every case in which a
will is ambiguous or silent with respect to a
controverted matter, it is the testator's intent
which must control, and we educe his design
not only from the language employed but from
a 'sympathetic reading of the will as an
entirety and in view of all the facts and
circumstances under which (its) provisions * *
* were framed.' (Matter of Fabri's Will, 2
N.Y.2d 236, 240, 159 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187, 140
N.E.2d 269, 271; see, also, Matter of Clark's
Will, 280 N.Y. 155, 160, 19 N.E.2d 1001,
1003.)
[2][3] The principle which emerges from the
cases may be briefly stated.
A trustee,
particularly
when
given
uncontrolled
discretion to invade principal (see, e.g., Matter
of Bisconti's Will, 306 N.Y. 442, 446, 119
N.E.2d 34, 36; Matter of Messer's Will, 34
Misc.2d 416, 420, 231 N.Y.S.2d 201, 205),
may, before deciding to effect an invasion,
take
into
account
the
beneficiary's
independent resources where there is no
'absolute' gift of principal, the prime gift
being that of income, and the testator
Intended that the 'invasion of the principal * *
* (be) dependent upon the needs or
Copr. ® West 1995 No claim

requirements of the beneficiary.' (Matter of
Martin's Will, 269 N.Y. 305, 312, 199 N.E.
491, 493; see, also, ***960 Matter of Garrett's
Will, 9 A.D.2d 545, 190 N.Y.S.2d 758, affd. 8
N.Y.2d 725, 201 N.Y.S.2d 102, 167 N.E.2d
644; Matter of Hogeboom's Will, 219 App.Div.
131, 219 N.Y.S. 436; Marrer of Messer's Will,
34 Misc.2d 416, 231 N.Y.S.2d 201, Supra.) The
rule is, however, different-that is, the trustee
may not consider the beneficiary's incomewhere the testator attached no condition of
need and Intended that 'The gift of principal
(be) as broad as the gift of interest' and the
first inseparable from the other. (Matter of
Martin's Will, 269 N.Y. 305, 310, 199 N.E.
491, 493, Supra; see, also, Matter of Clark's
Will, 280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E.2d 1001, Supra;
Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E.
237; Holden v. Strong, 116 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E.
960.)
[4] In the case before us, as already noted,
the trustee was given an absolute discretion to
invade principal if the income were *585
'insufficient' for the wife's support. Silent
though the will itself is as to whether her own
income was to be considered, study of the
testament as a whole, in the light of the
attendant circumstances, makes it plain
beyond doubt that, although the testator
wished to provide for his wife during her
lifetime, his paramount concern was for his
daughters and their children and his desire
was to preserve his estate for them.
Turning, first, to the testator's will, it is
instinct with his affection and concern for
**721 his descendants. He left his total estate
to his three daughters in equal shares if his
wife predeceased him. Any income from the
trust which she did not need for her support
was to be added to the principal which they
were to inherit. In the event of a daughter's
predeceasing his wife, he made elaborate
provision for gifts over to his grandchildren.
Inclusion of the latter provision goes far
toward establishing that he did not envisage a
possible exhaustion of the trust corpus--a
result which might ensue if the principal is to
be invaded without regard to his wife's own
income.
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As for the situation existing at the time he
made his will-which continued until his
death--the testator's wife was incurably ill.
The trust which he created for her benefit was
designed to assure her an income which would
take care of her probable needs if, and only if,
her social security payments were also applied
to her support. In point of fact, he had
actually used those payments for that purpose
while he was alive, and there is no reason to
believe that he wished that practice to be
discontinued after he died. He certainly did
not intend the social security payments of his
hopelessly ill and incompetent wife to
accumulate for her heirs and permit the trust
principal, which he wished to preserve for his
own issue, to be diminished and, perhaps,
consumed.
As already appears from our treatment of
the cases, the decisions relied upon by the
petitioner (see Matter of Clark's Will, 280
N.Y. 155, ***961 19 N.E.2d 1001, Supra;
Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E.
237, Supra; Holden v. Strong, 116 N.Y. 471,
22 N.E. 960, Supra) are inapposite. The court
in those cases concluded, not on the basis of
the trust language alone, but on the strength
of the will as a whole and other relevant
factors, that a gift of principal was intended
and that the testator's almost exclusive
interest was in the beneficiary, the
remaindermen
occupying
a
completely
subsidiary position. *586 On the other hand,
as we have seen, the present testator made it
quite plain that his children were his primary
concern and any provision for his wife from
trust principal, as opposed to income, was
clearly secondary.
It follows from what we have said that in the
present case the trustee was privileged to take
the beneficiary's independent income into
account before invading principal.
The order appealed from should be reversed
and the matter remitted to the Surrogate's
Court for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion, with costs to all parties
appearing separately and filing separate briefs
payable out of the estate.
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SCILEPPI, Judge (dissenting).
I dissent and vote to affirm.
In my view, the result reached by the
majority is not only contrary to well-settled
law, but completely disregards the plain
language of the will.
It is axiomatic that the courts do not have
the power--nor is it their function-to remake
the will of a testator. Thus, if the language
used in the will is clear, precise and
unambiguous, there is no problem of
construction; rather, there is an obligation of
enforcement.
As this court stated in Matter of Bisconti's
Will, 306 N.Y. 442, 445, 119 N.E.2d 34, 35
'The application of the rules of construction of
wills is for the purpose of determining the
intent of the testator where that intent is not
clearly expressed by the testamentary words,
and the rules of construction are to be
disregarded when the language is clear and
definite. It is well established that rules of
construction are merely subsidiary aids.
Matter of Watson's Will, 262 N.Y. 284, 293,
294, 186 N.E. 787, 788, 789. If intention of a
will-maker is to be found in the words used in
the will and these are clear and definite there
is no power to change them. Matter of
Watson's Will, Supra. As is stated in Davids
on the New York Law of Wills: 'When
intention can be ascertained as a fact from
**722 the instrument itself * * * there is no
occasion for a presumption in respect thereof,
and the decision should not be affected by the
rules in question.
Hence the rules of
construction are to be disregarded where the
decedent's intention is clearly or sufficiently
manifest, or where the language of the
instrument is plain and its meaning ***962
obvious.' Vol. I, s 491, p. 805; see Matter of
Rollins' Will, 271 App.Div. 982, 68 N.Y.S.2d
116, affd. 297 N.Y. 612, 75 N.E.2d 627.'
*587 The clause in question on this appeal is
clear and unequivocal. It establishes a trust,
the income of which is to be paid for life to the
testator's incompetent widow, and then
provides that, 'if such income be insufficient
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for the support and maintenance of (my wife),
my Trustee shall so pay or use from principal
sufficient moneys to provide for (my wife's)
support and maintenance, in the sole, absolute
and uncontrolled discretion of the Trustee'.
This language clearly makes the gift of
principal as broad as the gift of interest. The
gift of principal is not conditioned upon the
particular needs of the widow but rather upon
the insufficiency of the income to provide
support and maintenance. In such a situation,
the private income of the beneficiary cannot
be considered.
The applicable rule was
succinctly stated by this court in Matter of
Martin's Will, 269 N.Y. 305, 312, 199 N.E.
491, 495: 'The primary question in this class
of cases always is, does the will constitute an
absolute gift of support and maintenance
which it makes a charge upon the income from
the estate and upon principal? If, so, then the
private income of the beneficiary cannot be
considered. If, however, the gift is of income
coupled with a provision that the principal
may be invaded in case of need, the private
income of the beneficiary must be considered
in determining whether such need exists.'
In Martin, the court held that the private
income of the beneficiary was to be considered
in determining whether to invade principal.
But, there, unlike the present case, the will
provided for the invasion of principal 'as (the
beneficiary) may require for her care, support
and comfort, during her natural life'.
In almost every case where the will in
question provided for the invasion of principal,
if the income from the trust was Insufficient or
in cases where the trust provided for the use of
income and so much of principal 'as may be
necessary' with no limitation of the amount of
principal which may be invaded, the courts of
this State have uniformly found that such
language constituted an absolute gift of
support and maintenance without regard to
the private income of the beneficiary.
Contrary to the assertion of the majority
herein, the case of Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236
N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 237, is directly in point.
In that case, as in this one, the committee of
Copr. ® West 1995 No c
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an adjudged incompetent alleged that it was
the duty of the trustee to pay for the *588
support and maintenance of the incompetent
out of the income and principal of the trust
which had been created by the will of the
incompetent's mother. At the time that the
testatrix executed her will she was aware that
her son owned certain valuable property and
was in receipt of an income from ***963 the
estate of his father. As in the instant case, the
trustee in Rezzemini represented the vested
remaindermen
and claimed that the
incompetent's income from all other sources
must be exhausted before any invasion of
principal was warranted.
In construing the clause in question, which
reads as follows: 'If the income from my estate
shall be insufficient for the proper support of
my said son, then in that event, I authorize
and empower my said trustee to expend so
much of the principal thereof as may be
necessary for that purpose', this court held:
'Our decision in the case of Holden v. Strong,
116 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E. 960, involved the
construction of a will wherein the testator
gave to a trustee 'full power and authority to
use so much **723 of the trust fund, either
interest or principal, as shall, in his judgment
and discretion, be necessary for the proper
care, comfort and maintenance' of the plaintiff
so long as he should live. We held that the
plaintiff there was entitled to support and
maintenance even though he was able to
support himself and had accumulated a fund
which he had on deposit in a bank. The
reasoning and principal laid down in that case
we regard as controlling the case under
consideration.' (Rezzemini v. Brooks, Supra,
p. 193,140 N.E. p. 240.)
In other words, since the language of the
clause-which is almost identical to language
of the clause now before us-clearly
conditioned the gift from principal solely upon
the insufficiency of the income to provide for
care and support and not upon the necessity of
the beneficiary, it was held that the private
income of the beneficiary could not be
considered.
Matter of Clark's Will, 280 N.Y. 155, 19
to orig. U.S. govt, works
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N.E.2d 1001, is another case in point. In
Clark (pp. 158-159, 19 N.E.2d p. 1002) the
testator established a life trust for his widow
and then provided: 'In the event that the
income provided for my said wife under
paragraph 'Fourth' above shall, in the
judgment of my trustee, be insufficient for her
every comfort and support, I authorize may
said trustee to pay to her, in addition to
income, such portion of the principal of the
said trust as it shall from time to time deem
necessary.'
*589 In a proceeding for the settlement of
the accounts of the trustee, an objection was
made to the allowance of an amount paid out
of principal for the benefit of the widow. This
court held:
'The provisions of the will are not
ambiguous, the intent of the testator is clear
from the face of the instrument, and we may
determine for ourselves what the instrument
itself contains. Ascertainment of the intent of
the testator as shown by his will, taken as a
whole, is our primary purpose, and, when
ascertained, is to prevail over all other canons
of construction. Matter of James, 146 N.Y. 78,
100, 40 N.E. 876; Matter ***964 of Buechner,
226 N.Y. 440, 123 N.E. 741. The will clearly
provides for payment by the trustee in
quarterly installments of the entire income
from the trust and of so much of the principal
in addition thereto as, in the sole judgment of
the trustee, shall by it be deemed necessary
for every comfort and support of the widow.
'In conformity to that purpose and intent,
the trustee is required to furnish every
comfort and support for the widow which it
may deem in a sound discretion necessary out
of income and, if required, out of the corpus,
even to the extent of exhausting the entire
corpus of the trust, without taking into
consideration or account the personal income
of the beneficiary from any other source.
Holden v. Strong, 116 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E. 960;
Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E.
237. What is necessary for the purpose is
limited only by the amount of the income and
the corpus of the trust. Whatever income the
beneficiary may have from sources other than
Copr. © West 1995 No c
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the trust is of no concern to the trustee in
forming its judgment as to the amount
necessary for her every comfort and support.
The testator did not contemplate that his
widow should be required to use her own
personal income or to incur individual
obligations for her comfort and support as long
as there was anything in the trust that might,
in the sound discretion of the trustee, be used
for that purpose.' (Matter of Clark's Will,
Supra, pp. 160-161,19 N.E.2dp. 1003.)
Matter of Johnson's Estate, 46 Misc.2d 52,
258 N.Y.S.2d 922, also involved a proceeding
concerning an incompetent. In that case the
will provided (p. 54, 258 N.Y.S.2d p. 924): 'If,
at any time, in their sole and unrestricted
judgment and discretion, my Trustees shall
determine that the income from said trust
shall not be adequate for the comfortable
support *590 and maintenance of my said
wife, then and in that event, I authorize and
empower my **724 Trustees, from time to
time, to encroach upon the principal of said
trust fund and pay therefrom to, or for the
benefit of, my said wife, such portion of the
principal of said trust as, in their sole and
unrestricted judgment and discretion, my
Trustees may deem necessary and proper for
the comfortable support and maintenance of
my wife'.
In construing this provision of the will, the
Surrogate found as follows (p. 56, 258
N.Y.S.2d p. 927): 'When the language of
earlier cases, beginning with Holden v.
Strong, 116 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E. 960 (1889),
Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E.
237 (1923), and that of Matter of Martin's Will
(supra), and Matter of Clark's Will (supra) is
compared with the language above quoted in
Paragraph 'FIFTH (2)' of the will of decedent,
it appears to this court that the decedent
intended to make an absolute gift of support
and maintenance, ***965 which was a charge
upon income and principal, and the Court so
decides. Therefore, the private income of the
beneficiary
cannot
be
considered
in
determining how much principal should be
paid to the beneficiary.'
The Surrogate then went on to hold that the
to orig. U.S. govt, works
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test for invasion of principal is solely whether
the income is sufficient for support, and not
whether the beneficiary needs the principal.
In Matter of GrubeFs Will, 37 Misc.2d 910,
235 N.Y.S.2d 21, the court was faced with a
will which also provide, as in the case at bar,
that in the event that the trustees shall find
that the net income obtainable from a trust set
up for the decedent's wife 'will provide
insufficient for the needs of my beloved wife'
then the trustees were authorized to withdraw
from the corpus whatever sums may be
necessary to enable the wife to live in a proper
manner. The Surrogate held that the trust
provisions constituted an absolute gift of
support and that the other resources of the
beneficiary were not relevant.
In Matter of Leahy's Estate, Sur., 56
N.Y.S.2d 555, the court was faced with a claim
for funds by the State Department of Hospitals
where the income beneficiary had been
confined in a mental hospital. In finding an
absolute gift of income and principal, the court
held (p. 556): 'Only as to invasion of principal
did the testator leave anything to the
'discretion' of the trustees. The will provides
liberally that if the income should ever
become *591 insufficient for the comfortable
maintenance of the beneficiary in accordance
with her accustomed mode of living, then
there is given to the trustees the 'power to
advance to her, or to pay for her benefit, any
additional sum from the principal of said trust
fund as they in their discretion deem
necessary.' This discretion goes only to the
amount of the invasion at any time. There is
not any power given to decide whether or not
there shall be any payment made at all.' (See,
e.g., Matter of Van Gaalen's Estate, 38
Misc.2d 853, 239 N.Y.S. 312; Matter of
Connors' Estate, 34 Misc.2d 1043, 225
N.Y.S.2d 949; Matter of Vaturi's Estate, 33
Misc.2d 295, 223 N.Y.S.2d 931; Matter of
Paster's Estate, 22 Misc.2d 4, 198 N.Y.S.2d
441.)

H

the author of the majority opinion herein
observed in his dissent in Matter of
Gulbenkian's Will, 9 N.Y.2d 363, 372-373,
214 N.Y.S.2d 379, 384, 174 N.E.2d 481, 485:
'when a will contains language which has
acquired, through judicial decision, a definite
and established significance, the testator is
taken to have employed the language in that
sense and with that meaning in mind. (See
Matter of Krooss, 302 N.Y. 424, 428, 99
N.E.2d 222 (47 A.L.R.2d 894).'
***966 I agree with the courts below that
the testator's primary intention was to
bequeath the income and principal of the trust
for the support and maintenance of **725 his
widow without regard to her personal income.
While it is obvious that testator was concerned
with ilio welfare of his children and
grandchildren, it is equally obvious, especially
since testator was aware of his wife's
permanent incapacity and of her private
resources, that her maintenance and support
was his primary consideration. If he had
intended the result reached by the majority,
he could easily have made provision for his
wife based upon need. This, however, he did
not do. Having provided that if income would
be insufficient to provide for the wife, that the
trust be invaded, this court should not now
remake the will, even though the result may
be the depletion of the contingent estate of the
children and of the infant contingent
remaindermen.
Accordingly, I wo mid affirm.
BURKE, BERGAN, KEATING and JASEN,
JJ., concur with FULD, J.
SCILEPPI, J., dissents and votes to affirm in
a separate opinion in which BREITEL, J.,
concurs.
Order reversed, etc.
END OF DOCUMENT

It would appear from a review of the cases in
this area that the language used in the instant
will has acquired through judicial decision, a
definite and established significance. And, as
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